I do not know what victory looks like in a counter insurgency.  With the recent bombing in Baghdad it is hard to say that a true victory and a true peace has been achieved.  There are still deadly attacks on US troops.

The true success of the war in Iraq will be revealed in the coming months and years.

But what is for sure is that the fight is now being waged by the Iraqi police and, to a lesser degree, the Iraqi army.

After full implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement on June 30th 2009, the US role in the remaining counter insurgency has dwindled.  The US Forces in Iraq are no longer waging an active war against violent extremist networks, their role now is stability, economics, governance and training.

The US Forces Iraq fill a gap between the central government of Iraq and local government.

Here in Saladin province north of Baghdad the 4th Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division is rapidly adapting to the new normal.

In 2007 during the troop surge the 4th Brigade was deployed to some of the roughest parts of Baghdad like West Rashid, Ammel, Bayaa and Rustamya.  I was embedded with unis from the 4th Brigade in 2007 and filmed the soldiers as they actively hunted down Jaish al Mahdi and Al Qaida cells and shot it out with hidden gunmen.  I went with them on grueling daily patrols through the neighborhoods to conduct census and intelligence gathering missions.

In 2007 the Iraqi Army and Police were in the background and at best they were merely ineffective, at worst they were aligned with the active enemy.

Now, in late 2009, the 4th is back in Iraq in the area around Tikrit with a whole new mission.

The few remaining small outposts will be closed in the coming months with all the soldiers consolidated on major bases.

When soldiers do go outside the wire it is with the escort of the Iraqi police or army.  The destination is not a village to patrol or the hard hit on an insurgent leader but to a meeting with a politician, business leader, police chief or tribal sheik.

In 2007 the mantra was security first, then economic development and governance.  The US no longer has much of a role in security, the focus is economics and governance and preserving and strengthening the reconciliation between Sunni and Shia.

The weapons deployed on the battlefield to build up strong governance and economic growth are money and influence.  Both are both are integrated in the commanding officers of the Army units in Saladin province.

THE COMMANDER'S WAR

In a counter insurgency campaign the battle on the ground is typically carried out by Captains and NCOs.

That was the case in Iraq starting in 2004 and the responsibility for the battle increased in 2007 and 2008 during the troop surge.

After June 30 2009 when the Status of Forces Agreement went into effect the battlefield changed significantly for US forces.

US Soldiers no longer engage in intensive patrolling.  They no longer target, isolate and capture enemy targets.  In fact they do not go outside the wire unless it is with the Iraqi Army or Police as part of the convoy or operation.

The heavy lifting is now done almost exclusively by Iraqi military or police who build cases on targets, obtain arrest warrants and then go after the remaining enemy.  Sometimes US Special Forces assists with these raids, but the door kicking and zip-tying is done by Iraqis.

In Saladin the province there are really only 16 soldiers doing missions (or up to 52 depending if you count the lieutenants that lead platoons).  The rest of the soldiers are in support or provide security to those 16.  The soldiers pulling security for the officers are still in harms way and have to be sharp, but they are in support of the mission rather than their usual role of executing the mission.

The officers, normally the ones who plan and lead the mission are now the ones at the tip of the spear acting more as diplomats than gunslingers.

The 16 are made up of 12 Company Commanders, 3 Battalion Commanders and the Brigade Commander.

In many ways these officers are best thought of as a weapon system to loaded, aimed and fired on the battlefield to obtain a certain effect.

The are "loaded" with information, intelligence products and background data; "aimed" at a target be it a Sheik or member of the government in Saladin province; "fired" to achieve a certain effect like efficient functioning of a city council or transparency in the contract bidding process or to gather information about potential sources of instability.  It often takes many fires to achieve any effect.

The battlespace has long ceased to be physical terrain.  After the SOFA agreement went into effect, the US military ceased to have any real control over cities and roads or even dirt, sand and rocks for that matter.  The remaining terrain is entirely human and it is divided up along the government/tribal hierarchy flow chart with Lieutenants and Captains working with the lower levels, the Battalion Commanders working with the middle level and the Brigade Commander working with the upper echelon.

The difficulty in treating an officer like a weapon system is that it is smart weapon that can occasionally do dumb things when not properly loaded, aimed and fired for a specific effect.

To prevent this some Battalion Commanders, when in weapons mode are actually loaded, aimed and fired by their staff.  The Commander is still the commander, especially for control of the unit, but on the battlefield he is tasked by his staff to do certain things in a Key Leader Engagement, which is the military term for meeting with an influential Iraq.  He is assigned to make certain points, try to gather information, etc.

It is important for the Commander to be managed to maintain coordinated fires between his subordinate and adjacent units and to prevent collateral damage or fratricide.  The commander as a weapon system may have more information than anyone else in his unit, but he does not have every piece of information.  Once the commander says something it is like a bullet being fired--it cannot be put back in the barrel.

A promise that has to be gone back on can be devastating.  Saying you will do X but not following through causes loss of credibility.  Iraq is a quid pro quo, negotiation and hospitality based culture where everyone is trying to get something for nothing.  The astute officer needs to approach it the same way--never give something for nothing, always under promise and/or do what Iraqis do to Americans--make frequent use of insha-allah, Allah Willing, a polite way of saying "maybe, but most likely not."

Many commanders go in to a meeting with a "No Pen" line.  In a defensive position like the gate to a base or outpost, the "No Pen" or "No Penetration" line the point where the guards start firing everything they have to keep the enemy out.

In a meeting with an Iraqi leader, the no pen line can be projects over a certain dollar value or any task that takes too much time or effort or should be done through the Government of Iraq.  The commander will then fire plenty of Insha Allahs at the Iraqi leader.

In the complex relationships of Iraqi tribal and governmental networks there are dozens of snares and tripwires to be avoided.  Making it more difficult is that many of the key Iraqi leaders have been talking to American officers the past 6 years.  They are on their 6th set of officers to deal with and have been able to perfect their technique.  In the most benign of scenarios, they have merely become really good at getting development and reconstruction projects.  In the more nefarious they have, over the course of dealing with different units, been able to rehabilitate their images or conceal a blood stained past and opaque future goals.

The opaque nature of Iraq has increased as a result of the SOFA agreement.

FOG OF THIS PHASE OF WAR

Though I frequently dine with Iraqis, I have zero interaction with regular Iraqis.  I am outside the wire a lot, but my view is from a little window of four inches of armored glass.

In my previous trips to Iraq I was out on my feet a lot able to see regular residents of a village or neighborhood and interact with them at some level.

At the height of the Surge platoons were constantly patrolling conducting census operations and close encounters missions meeting 100 households a day.  That is a lot of contact to glean a lot of information and the mood of an area.

After June 30th, the only interaction is with politicians, sheiks, officers of the Iraqi Army and higher ranking police officers.

The closest contact to a normal Iraqi is with the bodyguards and personal security details of the people mentioned above.

The bottom up information flow is now funneled and filtered by politicians.

The true mood of the people of Saladin province is unknown.

I suggested to the Human Terrain Team in Saladin the solution would be a partnership with the political science or economics department with the University of Tikrit to conduct some polls.

Every Iraqi has a cell phone and while they are pre-paid, the carriers probably have a pretty good idea from their networks the ranges of numbers in a given area.

An Interactive Voice Response polling system (Robo Poll) similar to what I use in my work in the US could be put to great use in Iraq.  The university and students would get experience in running scientific randomized polls and the US forces could be able to broadly gauge the mood of the population and not be so situationally blind.

Saladin province could be simmering and ready to boil over and it would catch US Forces by complete surprise.  The street protests that we do see could be revealed as astro-turfed events or verified as wide spread sentiment.

In 2007 US Forces knew the protests against building security walls around certain neighborhoods was astro-turfed by Jaish al Mahdi because units were down on the streets hearing from residents that they wanted walls.  (Baghdad residents also made their own walls in some parts of the city.)

Is a street protest after Iraqi and US Special Forces conduct a raid a real outpouring of public rage?  Or was it orchestrated and astro-turfed to get the US military act a certain way?

The only way to know in this environment is to have polls in the field nearly every day.

Until something like is instituted at the Brigade level, the primary source of information comes while eating.

GOAT GRABS

The primary mission of the weaponized commander is to converse with their peers, to act the role of a tribal or political leader.

The author and former Marine Officer Bing West titled his most recent book, "The Strongest Tribe."  The Marines were the strongest tribe in Anbar province Iraq and a Battalion commander has much in common with a tribal leader.  An infantry Battalion is a powerful tribe and with reconstruction funds added to the mix, a rich tribe.

Over the years the Iraqi leaders have become adept at dealing with American Officers.  The Sr. Officers in the Army have also become very adept at dealing with Iraqis.

There is a lot a eating and a lot of tea drinking and exchanging of token gifts.  Iraqi leaders host officers at dinner parties in their homes.  Most Army units have built special huts huts or rooms that are set up like the office of Iraqi politician or security forces officer.  There is a desk at one end of the room, comfortable couches and chairs lining the walls, and small tables for serving tea and beverages.

The Officer will then reciprocate by hosting their Iraqi counter parts.  Members of the command staffs have learned how to properly brew and serve the tea.

Little gestures like that tend to go a long way toward developing and maintaining working relationships.

US Officers no longer "get down to business".  They have learned to ask about families, keep track of the names of their counterpart's sons and extended family.  Most BN commanders have a note taker and/or a reporters voice recorder running to capture the conversation.

The best commanders are like politicians, never forgetting a name and remembering the names of children and family members.  Of course those are all on briefing notes before the meeting.

The work is slow and delicate and does not require a large combat force.  It could probably be done with half the personnel in the country or less.

THIS IS HOW IT ENDS

No matter what the situation really is in Iraq, this is how it ends for the United States.  The big train is pulling out of the station and there is no stopping it.

Brigades will likely be replaced by Battalions.  Places where there are Battalions will be replaced by Companies.  Some bases will be reduced to "warm bases" a place US soldiers do not live at daily, but can use as place to hole up when they need to.

The massive Division Headquarters staffs will be pared down to the bare bones.  There has not been much for a Division HQ to actually do in years and even less now.  When a Division really only has 48 people out on the battlefield conducting operations, it doesn't take 400 people to manage them.

A major challenge is how to take apart and transport out so many of the things that have been built up in the past 6 years.  Some of the major bases will likely remain open, these are places with airfields that can handle large cargo planes and are near major highways.  A short list of bases that will likely stay open includes BIAP, LSA Anaconda, TQ, COB Speicher, Al Asad.

US commanders, in their conversations with the remaining Iraqi leaders openly hostile to the US, ask, "What do you want?  You want the US to leave?  We are leaving.  What do you really want?"

For many of the remaining irreconcilables their identity is wrapped up in being anti-American.  In 18 months they will have very little to complain about.

The war may not be "won" but definitely has not been lost and only time will tell if the Iraqis will secure victory.

(The companion photo essay to this story can be found here )

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