Apr
17
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Friday, 17 April 2009 |
In 2007 Baghdad, Iraq was the undisputed murder capital of the world.
In the West Rashid district of Baghdad, the mayhem had spiraled so far out of control, the few residents that remained nick-named the district 'The Arena.'
While embedded with U.S. Infantry units in West Rashid in 2007, those murders, referred to by the military as Extra Judicial Killings, were a part of my daily life.
What we know now is that a few of those murders were committed by U.S. Forces.
This week a U.S. Soldier from a unit I embedded with was convicted of murder. Others from the unit have already been Court Martialed and convicted.
The unit was Alpha Company 1-18.
They are the subject of my new documentary, "Baghdad Happens".
I was not embedded with them when the murders were committed and to my knowledge, none of the Soldiers who overcame the twists of fortune to turn a mission from failure to success and are featured in "Baghdad Happens" are involved in the criminal proceedings.
It is always an honor and privilege for me to film and live with soldiers and I have the deepest respect for the young men who volunteered to take on the responsibility of warfare.
The events unfolding in the military court rooms and what is depicted in my documentay "Baghdad Surge" and "Baghdad Happens" are a tale of two approaches to war.
In "Baghdad Surge" the movie begins with a terrorist attack on some member of the Iraqi Highway Patrol and is followed-up shortly with a murder comitted by Iraqi Police.
In "Baghdad Happens" the Soldiers of Alpha prevent a murder.
In "Baghdad Surge" Captain Brian Ducote is determined to bring justice to the Iraqi police who murdered a man his unit's area of responsibility. The departed was definately not a good guy, but Ducote would not tolerate murder.
Less than a kilometer away from Ducote, other soldiers had been dispensing street justice Baghdad style.
The U.S. Army is showing clearly that it will not tolerate murder.
The most difficult part of counter insurgency is the moral component and the restraint needed to maintain that morality.
While it is impossible to win hearts and minds, it is possible to be consistent in following the rules of land warfare and that consistency makes the coalition a better alternative than the arbitrary and capricious militias.
Maintaining a moral code in combat is more difficult than actual combat operations. It requires a degree of self control civillians never have to face.
In 2007, I could feel the dread in Baghdad. Death permeated the city. It was almost like a pall had fallen on the city bringing out the worst in humans.
The Soldiers of the Surge lived with that death every day for their entire tour. Alpha had the absolute worst of it.
After a month in Baghdad, I went back to Al Anbar province. It felt like a weight had been lifted from my shoulders.
A few of the soldiers of Alpha succumbed to that weight, they were crushed by the darkness and became a part of it.
While I cannot condone their behaviour, I do understand how it happens.
"Baghdad Happens" shows some of the soldiers of Alpha Company. It is a different kind of documentary. It is upbeat. It captures the thrill of a successful mission and the complexity of even a simple mission.
It captures a group of young men on one day. It is a snap shot of the war. And that snap shot shows a group of brave men.
"Baghdad Happens" is the unintentional counter-balance to what is unfolding in the courts martial in Germany.
As the story of the courts martial grows, which it will, I hope my movie shows that there is more to the story of Alpha Company.
Yes, the darkness captured the souls of a few men, but far more of the men of Alpha were the ones who beat back the night and brought light and life back to West Rashid and Baghdad.
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Apr
13
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 13 April 2009 |
A few days ago, after a brief exchange with Ed from hotair.com , I quickly typed up a rational choice model of how the standoff could end.
Based on the game settlements, I postulated the most likely outcome would be O4/T3.
The O4 standing for Obama Option #4 was "Pirates taken by force, Captain saved."
The T3 standing for Pirates, terrorist Option #3 was "Pirates taken by force, Captain killed, US personnel killed."
Ed, after seeing the scenarios, agreed that my O4/T3 was probably where it would end up.
I ran a another scenario in which the pirates were "run-of-the-mill" but as the facts played out, the pirates were more committed to the cause than that game scenario revealed.
The two levels of pirates addressed the big known unkown-- how recalcitrant the pirates would be.
Now, how did a blogger run a half-assed version of rational choice game theory and get it right?
Well, I can tell you I did very little research. I scanned Google headlines, skimmed the wikipedia and drew more than anything else on my experience watching these scenarios game out in Iraq.
I also run more complex rational choice game models in the political campaigns I consult on.
The key with all of these is motive. Understanding what the sides want. I don't get bogged down into "why", because that is best thought of as another thing they want.
As it turned out, President Obama as National Command Authority gave the military broad authority within the general orders. The Commander on scene made the call in split second decision, and could because the assets were in place.
When the President gave the authorization, he jumped to an O4 option. As I previously stated, O4 was fraught with danger, but the best option because it has the highest payoff. And if the pirates were terrorists, well, then there really was no other acceptable option in the scenario.
According to the initial reports I read--and I have only skimmed a few--the Pirates chose to jump into their own T3.
This was not difficult, it did not require any particular insight, just a little logic.
When you take motive into account, you can eliminate a couple of options T6, T7, T8 and O7, O8.
If you add options, lowest number being best, then divide by the number of options you get 3.27 as a mathematical settlement average.
That is the absolute most crude, poorly calculated way to play rational choice. But the models generally work like that.
Options are listed, weighted, then a settlement arrived at.
The important part is to understand that each player is acting in a way that is rational to them, which is why you need to understand motive.
Understand motive, and you can predict a lot of behaviour, even if it is irrational, people can be predictable in their irrationality.
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Apr
09
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Friday, 10 April 2009 |
Something strange is happening in the situation of the captain being held hostage by Somali pirates.
U.S. Citizens are taken hostage by brigands rather often and rarely, very rarely is the FBI employed in these situations. As person who travels through a lot of foreign countries I know the U.S. position rather well--if you are taken hostage or kidnapped and held for ransom, you are pretty much on your own.
So, this situation has interesting components.
Lets start with what we know about the pirates:
Started operating more frequently in 1990s
They are in it mostly for the money
Usually do not harm crew
Hold cargo for ransom
Made about $150m last year
Some Pirates linked to terror groups
This particular group is thought to be linked to AQI
The other party to this situation is President Obama.
In rational choice theory, the game, when played properly, zeroes in on motive.
President Obama, like all politicians has the foremost objective of 'looking good'. His motivation is to avoid a situation that he looks bad, incompetent, weak etc. His goal is avoid an outcome where the fact pattern makes him look bad.
So, now we look at the various options, ranked in preference among the players in a very crude rational choice game.
Obama
O1 Pirates surrender
O2 Pirates release Captain, then taken by force
O3 Pirates release Captain, then escape
O4 Pirates taken by force, Captain saved
O5 Pirates taken by force, Captain killed
O6 Pirates taken by force, Captain killed, US personnel killed
O7 Pirates escape with Captain
O8 Pay off Pirates, Pirates double cross, kill captain, becomes publicly known
Pirates, non-terrorist
P1 Collect ransom, release captain, continue business
P2 Release Captain, continue business
P3 Surrender, handed over to regional authorities, continue business
P4 Surrender, wind up in prison
P5 Taken by force, Captain lives, wind up in prison
P6 Taken by force, Pirates killed
Pirates, terrorist
T1 Pay off Pirates, Pirates double cross, kill Captain, youtube video
T2 Escape with Captain
T3 Pirates taken by force, Captain killed, US personnel killed
T4 Pirates taken by force, Captain killed
T5 Pirates taken by force, Captain saved
T6 Pirates release Captain, then taken by force
T7 Pirates release Captain, allowed to escape
T8 Pirates surrender
If we are dealing with run-of-the-mill pirates, then the outcome will be P3, the pirates surrender then are handed over to regional authorities who slap their wrists and let them continue business.
In this scenario everybody pretty much gets what they want.
But, if we are dealing with terrorist pirates, look at how the options line up on the continuum. The best case for Obama is the worst for the terrorist pirates and vice versa.
Anything from O5 through O8 is politically unaccepable to Obama and O4 has a probablity of turning into O5. But O4 has a high payoff.
Anything beyond T4 is politically unacceptable to the terrorists. This assumes that the pirate terrorists are full on nut jobs ready for martyrdom. If they are not committed to the Jihad, then it will be a P3 with a P5 veneer, or O5. They will let themselves be taken.
If these are terrorist pirates, then this is a test. To see what Obama does. At which point the result is transmitted to the world and Obama's measure is taken. Terrorists play more for Gross Rating Points and headlines than they do for tactical advantage.
An ocean standoff dragging on would be good for GRPs, especially if the terrorist pirates let it be known they are terrorists. This is bad for Obama politically, but allowing them to stall is tactically smart. The terrorists will tire out, run out of potable water and food.
The tactical downside risk is that they just go ahead and kill the Captain then martyr themselves in whatever fashion is most dramatic--which gets them what they wanted anyway, headlines.
So, the settlement is O4/T3. Obama rolls the dice, lets the SEALS do their thing and if all goes well, the result will be O4. O4 also has the most positive GRPs for the United States--not just Obama.
But this drama on the high seas is only Act I. What really counts is the follow-on actions that will resolve the piracy problem or allow business as usual.
This game I have mapped out is 'on-the-fly' I have not calculated weights on what is known, the known uknowns and the most important factor the uknown unknowns. The unknown unknowns--the things you don't know and don't even realize you don't know--are what usually what destroy a plan or a model. I have not even really thought out the motives, which is the key, and the scenarios the motives would operate on.
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Apr
08
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 08 April 2009 |
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In response to the demands and actions of Muslim Barbary Pirates, President Thomas Jefferson sent the Marines . (Marines and some professional military contractors.)
Thus the verse in the Marine Corps Hymn , "To the shores of Tripoli."
Muslim pirates, this time centered around Somalia, are once again making demands and threatening U.S. interests.
Will Obama respond like Jefferson?
Previous blogs mentioning the Barbary Pirates as the first U.S. war with Islamic enemies here and here .
UPDATE: Crew of the hi-jacked vessel has overpowered the Pirates. So, we'll have to wait and see if the Pirates present another opportunity for Obama to act, or, if he will use this instance as justification for going after the Pirates O'Bannon style.
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Apr
07
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 08 April 2009 |
"I was tired," Firas said when I talked with him last October in Baghdad.
Firas, a former Jaish al Mahdi Special Groups commander, had been on the run from coalition forces since the summer of 2007. By the late summer of 2008, he was ready to throw in the towell and work with the coalition.
Firas was one of many 'good enough' bad guys who have decided, at least for then, to sort of work with the coalition.
Prior to flipping sides, Firas was a wanted man. He never slept in the same place twice and was barely one-step ahead of U.S. Soldiers for months.
Firas opened up communications with the soldiers and they cautiously started to work out an agreement.
Talking with the enemy is nothing new. It is as old as warfare and almost required in counter insurgency.
In the original counter insurgency, Julius Caesar's campaigns to put down rebellions in Gaul, Caesar regularly recieved ambassadors from the rebelling factions.
In the Roman Civil war, Caesar corresponded with Pompey.
Caesar also made a habit of enlisting soldiers of conquered armies into his army.
In Baghdad, during the surge, I saw Lt. Col Patrick Frank call up JAM leaders on their cell phones. Captain Brian Ducote would talk with Sunni and Shia assassins, letting them know that they could turn themselves in, or face his soldiers on the streets of West Rashid.
What these conversations all had in common was the position of strength. Caesar always negotiated from a position of strength. Lt. Col. Frank and Capt. Ducote were speaking from a position of strength. The were dictating the terms. Firas, when he approached the U.S. Army Battalion in Rashid did it from a position of supplication and self preservation.
In President Obama's new AfPak plan, the section "Encouraging Afghan government efforts to integrate reconcilable insurgents", states:
"While Mullah Omar and the Taliban's hard core that have aligned themselves with al Qaeda are not reconcilable and we cannot make a deal that includes them, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won without convincing non-ideologically committed insurgents to lay down their arms, reject al Qaeda, and accept the Afghan Constitution."
This will require talking to the enemy. The key is that the talking cannot be just to talk. It cannot be done from a position of weakness, it must be done the way Ducote and Frank and Caesar it--from a position of power where the choices are clear, quit, join us, or face off against us and suffer the consequences.
In the Victorian era, British officers like Robert Warburton, who managed the Khyber pass for 18 years, held the tribes accountable for miscreants in their midst. Warburton fined the tribes when their members got out of hand and made it clear that the tribal Maliks were responsible for keeping their clans and territory in order.
Warburton and others used the same technique Lt. Col. Steve Russell used in Tikrit--I can come here with the hand of friendship or with a pistol, the choice is yours.
Or, as in the message Marine General Mattis is reputed to have sent to Iraqi tribal leaders: "I come in peace. I didn’t bring artillery. But I’m pleading with you, with tears in my eyes: If you fuck with me, I’ll kill you all."
But, you must be willing to use the pistol. You have to back up your position of strength with lethality and effective COIN operations.
The Soldiers and Marines know how to do this, they have done it before. The component required for the President to fulfill is to employ enough combat forces on the ground and to back up the Soldiers and Marines with the same metal they display while outside the wire.
The enemy reads the New York Times, they watch CNN. They will take the President's measure and if it is lacking, if they think he will blink first, if he shows any signs of weakness, then the Soldiers and Marines though operating from local strength, will be in a strategically weak position to offer and enforce the ultimatums needed to flip those Taliban fighters who can be reconciled.
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Apr
07
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Tuesday, 07 April 2009 |
"When thousands of Americans were killed at Pearl Harbor, our nation went to war. Had the Japanese claimed we could not pursue them, say, across the International Date Line, we would have laughed. Yet after bin Laden killed thousands in 2001, our generals, politicians, and president stopped at the arbitrary Durand Line (the official border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawn by a British colonial official in 1893) and thus granted a sanctuary to al-Qaeda when it was at its weakest. When attacked at home, we responded as a kinder, gentler nation--and were less feared for our response."
Bing is a true subject matter expert. Here is his latest article .
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Apr
01
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 01 April 2009 |
This report caught my attention over the weekend.
A less hyped report is here .
Most likely it is nothing. The coalition and ISF are always arresting bad guys posing as good guys. It is too easy in war to read too much into the daily events.
But, nearly two years ago I wrote about what could be the looming real civil war in Iraq and how it tied to the awakening movement.
I wrote then:
"They [Anbar Sunni Sheiks] may have also seen the need to build an Anbar based security force that can be used--if need be--to wage a real civil war against against the Shia.
"This civil war would not be teenaged death squads killing Shia or Sunni at random but the Beirut style civil war Fearon writes about. In other words, it would be a real civil war."
The non-civil war of 2006 and early 2007 that I witnessed was more of a sectarian blood debt run amok than a real civil war. All it took to stop the blood debt cycle was for U.S. Soldiers to stand between the factions and say "stop." Occasionally they took on the responsibility of carrying out the debt, hunting down and capturing or, if they resisted, killing the leading perpetrators of violence.
The Sunni are now armed and organized enough to wage a real civil war.
I doubt it will jump off.
But U.S. Soldiers will be needed for a long time to stand between the factions and to step in say "stop."
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Mar
30
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 30 March 2009 |
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I'll be on Sound off Connecticut with Jim Vicevich on WTIC AM 1080 at 9:35 10:35 eastern Tuesday March 31st. Updated.
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Mar
28
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Saturday, 28 March 2009 |
Here's the white paper on President Obama's AfPak Plan.
Nothing in it to really disagree with. But, more telling, there is nothing to indicate that it will become successful.
In 2007 I was confident the Surge would succeed because it was attached to a complete change in strategy, codified in Army/Marine Field Manual FM 3-24.
In it one saw tried and true counter insurgency techniques employed by French in Algeria, British in Malaya and even Napoleanic troops in the Rhineland.
Many of those techniques will apply to Afghanistan.
The six-page paper produced by the administration does not inspire the confidence that one could see in the surge's application of solid counter insurgency principles.
Knowing that Petraeus is now commanding Cent Com and is personally overseeing the development of Afghan strategy and tactics gives me more hope than the administration's white paper.
But Afghanistan is not Iraq.
There is a great body of writing on Afghanistan from the British Victorian era. The British faced the same challenges we face. Indeed, the only thing that has changed in Afghanistan is the technology of the weaponry.
In my pre-deployment reading there is a recurring theme to these works, one summed up best by Robert Warburton:
"...to deal with Afghans, officers must be employed who have knowledge of their languages, customs and ways."
That quote comes from Warburton's memoir "Eighteen Years in the Khyber."
Let the title of the book sink in for a moment. Eighteen Years stationed in and around the Khyber pass. There were British officers stationed there before him and after him.
Warburton was the son of a British Officer and Afghan mother.
The administration's paper concludes:
"There are no quick fixes to achieve U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The danger of failure is real and the implications are grave."
Very few in America had the patience to see the surge through--even though it only took 18 months to achieve the objective.
Does the administration have the patience to create a modern generation of Warburtons who may spend 18 years in the Khyber?
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Feb
16
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 16 February 2009 |
On March 5th of 1809, the the British diplomat Mountstuart Elphinstone met with Shah Suja in Peshawar.
Shah Suja was the King of the Pathan tribes and Elphinstone's mission was the first official diplomatic meeting between the British and the Pathans.
After reading Elphinstone's vast survey of the Pathan tribes and the Shah's kingdom, one will be amazed at how little has changed.
Swords, pikes and matchlocks have been replaced with AK-47's and RPG's. Camels and horses have been replaced with pickup trucks and rickity buses.
But very little else has changed.
The nature of how little things have changed became starkly apparant to me a few months ago when young man from Peshawar, via Qatar, bought the corner gas station near where I live.
At first I chatted him up in Arabic, after seeing some script on a jacket he was wearing. I could tell he was not an Arab. And he confirmed that he was from Pakistan.
But, he went further. He was an Afghan, a Peshawar Pathan.
At the time Elphinstone met with Shah Suja, the Afghan/Pathan kingdom ran roughly from the Indus river in the east to the the plains south and west of Kabul.
This has historically been the domain of the Pathan peoples, the real Afghanistan. On a modern map it would cover the western parts of Pakistan, the tribal areas, the rugged mountains and west across most of modern Afghanistan.
The residents of those areas, even those living in the midwest of the United States, still think of themselves as the real Afghans. Historically, an Afghan was a member of the Pathan people.
As we move toward the official 200-year mark of western involvement in the region, it would behoove the Obama administration to read Elphinstone and understand that compared to the deeply ingrained identity and traits of the Pathans, the 200 years of varying adventures by British, Russians, Soviets and now the U.S. are just another in a long series of attempts that have usually failed and at best marginally succeeded.
The Kyhber is almost a rite of passage for the great empires. The only great empire that didn't make it to the Kyber was the Roman.
And most just passed through, very few stayed for long and none, none controlled the mountains. Not even the greatest of the Afghan kings really controlled the mountains.
The acknowledged truth is that but for a handful of brigands living in the mountains who harbor visions of being the vanguard of a new, unique Koranic generation bent on global jihad, no one would care about what happens in those mountains. The tribes would go about life as they have since before the time of Alexander.
The essential element of that life is the Pashtoonwali, the code of the Pathans, which all but mandates an eye for an eye type of fueding and defense of guests seeking asylum.
The code preceeded Islam and has withstood every attempt at modern corruption.
Understanding the code is how a few British officers were able to temporarily tame parts of the frontier and is the best hope for success in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yes, Pakistan. Because the terrain is human, Pathan, and not demarcated by an imaginary line.
And that is what Elphinstone understood 200 years ago that we need to understand today.
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