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Apr 07 2009
Bing West on Afghanistan
Written by JD Johannes   
Tuesday, 07 April 2009
"When thousands of Americans were killed at Pearl Harbor, our nation went to war. Had the Japanese claimed we could not pursue them, say, across the International Date Line, we would have laughed. Yet after bin Laden killed thousands in 2001, our generals, politicians, and president stopped at the arbitrary Durand Line (the official border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawn by a British colonial official in 1893) and thus granted a sanctuary to al-Qaeda when it was at its weakest. When attacked at home, we responded as a kinder, gentler nation--and were less feared for our response."

Bing is a true subject matter expert.  Here is his latest article .

 
Apr 01 2009
The Real Iraq Civil War
Written by JD Johannes   
Wednesday, 01 April 2009
This report caught my attention over the weekend.

A less hyped report is here .

Most likely it is nothing.  The coalition and ISF are always arresting bad guys posing as good guys. It is too easy in war to read too much into the daily events.

But, nearly two years ago I wrote about what could be the looming real civil war in Iraq and how it tied to the awakening movement.

I wrote then:

"They [Anbar Sunni Sheiks] may have also seen the need to build an Anbar based security force that can be used--if need be--to wage a real civil war against against the Shia.

"This civil war would not be teenaged death squads killing Shia or Sunni at random but the Beirut style civil war Fearon writes about.  In other words, it would be a real civil war."

The non-civil war of 2006 and early 2007 that I witnessed was more of a sectarian blood debt run amok than a real civil war.  All it took to stop the blood debt cycle was for U.S. Soldiers to stand between the factions and say "stop."  Occasionally they took on the responsibility of carrying out the debt, hunting down and capturing or, if they resisted, killing  the leading perpetrators of violence.

The Sunni are now armed and organized enough to wage a real civil war. 

I doubt it will jump off.

But U.S. Soldiers will be needed for a long time to stand between the factions and to step in say "stop."
 
Mar 30 2009
On The Radio
Written by JD Johannes   
Monday, 30 March 2009

I'll be on Sound off Connecticut with Jim Vicevich on WTIC AM 1080 at 9:35 10:35 eastern Tuesday March 31st. Updated.

 
Mar 28 2009
Obama's AfPak Plan
Written by JD Johannes   
Saturday, 28 March 2009
Here's the white paper on President Obama's AfPak Plan.

Nothing in it to really disagree with.  But, more telling, there is nothing to indicate that it will become successful.

In 2007 I was confident the Surge would succeed because it was attached to a complete change in strategy, codified in Army/Marine Field Manual FM 3-24.

In it one saw tried and true counter insurgency techniques employed by French in Algeria, British in Malaya and even Napoleanic troops in the Rhineland.

Many of those techniques will apply to Afghanistan.

The six-page paper produced by the administration does not inspire the confidence that one could see in the surge's application of solid counter insurgency principles.

Knowing that Petraeus is now  commanding Cent Com and is personally overseeing the development of Afghan strategy and tactics gives me more hope than the administration's white paper.

But Afghanistan is not Iraq.

There is a great body of writing on Afghanistan from the British Victorian era.  The British faced the same challenges we face.  Indeed, the only thing that has changed in Afghanistan is the technology of the weaponry.

In my pre-deployment reading there is a recurring theme to these works, one summed up best by Robert Warburton:

"...to deal with Afghans, officers must be employed who have knowledge of their languages, customs and ways."

That quote comes from Warburton's memoir "Eighteen Years in the Khyber."

Let the title of the book sink in for a moment.  Eighteen Years stationed in and around the Khyber pass.  There were British officers stationed there before him and after him.

Warburton was the son of a British Officer and Afghan mother.

The administration's paper concludes:

"There are no quick fixes to achieve U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The danger of failure is real and the implications are grave."

Very few in America had the patience to see the surge through--even though it only took 18 months to achieve the objective.

Does the administration have the patience to create a modern generation of Warburtons who may spend 18 years in the Khyber?

 
Feb 16 2009
200 Years In The Kingdom of Kabul
Written by JD Johannes   
Monday, 16 February 2009
On March 5th of 1809, the the British diplomat Mountstuart Elphinstone met with Shah Suja in Peshawar.

Shah Suja was the King of the Pathan tribes and Elphinstone's mission was the first official diplomatic meeting between the British and the Pathans.

After reading Elphinstone's vast survey of the Pathan tribes and the Shah's kingdom, one will be amazed at how little has changed.

Swords, pikes and matchlocks have been replaced with AK-47's and RPG's.  Camels and horses have been replaced with pickup trucks and rickity buses.

But very little else has changed.

The nature of how little things have changed became starkly apparant to me a few months ago when young man from Peshawar, via Qatar, bought the corner gas station near where I live.

At first I chatted him up in Arabic, after seeing some script on a jacket he was wearing.  I could tell he was not an Arab.  And he confirmed that he was from Pakistan.

But, he went further.  He was an Afghan, a Peshawar Pathan.

At the time Elphinstone met with Shah Suja, the Afghan/Pathan kingdom ran roughly from the Indus river in the east to the the plains south and west of Kabul.

This has historically been the domain of the Pathan peoples, the real Afghanistan.  On a modern map it would cover the western parts of Pakistan, the tribal areas, the rugged mountains and west across most of modern Afghanistan.

The residents of those areas, even those living in the midwest of the United States, still think of themselves as the real Afghans.  Historically, an Afghan was a member of the Pathan people.

As we move toward the official 200-year mark of western involvement in the region, it would behoove the Obama administration to read Elphinstone and understand that compared to the deeply ingrained identity and traits of the Pathans, the 200 years of varying adventures by British, Russians, Soviets and now the U.S. are just another in a long series of attempts that have usually failed and at best marginally succeeded.

The Kyhber is almost a rite of passage for the great empires.  The only great empire that didn't make it to the Kyber was the Roman.

And most just passed through, very few stayed for long and none, none controlled the mountains.  Not even the greatest of the Afghan kings really controlled the mountains.

The acknowledged truth is that but for a handful of brigands living in the mountains who harbor visions of being the vanguard of a new, unique Koranic generation bent on global jihad, no one would care about what happens in those mountains.  The tribes would go about life as they have since before the time of Alexander.

The essential element of that life is the Pashtoonwali, the code of the Pathans, which all but mandates an eye for an eye type of fueding and defense of guests seeking asylum.

The code preceeded Islam and has withstood every attempt at modern corruption.

Understanding the code is how a few British officers were able to temporarily tame parts of the frontier and is the best hope for success in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Yes, Pakistan.  Because the terrain is human, Pathan, and not demarcated by an imaginary line.

And that is what Elphinstone understood 200 years ago that we need to understand today.

 
Jan 16 2009
Understanding Joe
Written by JD Johannes   
Friday, 16 January 2009

Earlier this week I bapped Joe the Plumber for comments he made about reporters embedding with front line infantry.  I enjoy Joe's reports but had a strong disagreement with him on a policy point regarding the media in warfare.
 
In subsequent posts, with some background info from PJTV's Roger L. Simon I understood the full crazy context of what Joe said out on the street and in a sit-down, on-set, on-camera report.
 
You can see the full crazy context here.
 
http://pajamasmedia.com/instapundit/66511/
 
Once Joe took the time to flesh out his thoughts and reflect a bit, he's not for a blanket ban on embedded reporters, just frustrated with usual suspects and their shenanigans.
 
In my first post about Joe I stated that because I was in Iraq during his rise to fame I did not understand his appeal.  I'm beginning to understand it now.
 
And to Rick Sanchez....my quoting Les Grossman in a previous post applies to you.
 
Jan 15 2009
To All Those Who Recently Sent E-mail
Written by JD Johannes   
Thursday, 15 January 2009

I have received many interesting emails in the past 24 hours.

More emails than I ever receive while running around Iraq and more hits than I ever receive when filing reports from Iraq.

I want to point out something interesting.

The only post to get nearly the traffic as my comments on the Joe the Plumber is this one .

In the Spring of 2007, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said the war in Iraq was lost.

I was in Iraq at that time and was able to point to facts showing the contrary .

No one complained about my embedding then.  Well, Glenn Greenwald did, but time has proven him wrong.

I was the first civillian to see the Anbar Awakening spread down the Euphrates river valley from Ramadi toward Fallujah.

I was the first civillian to see it jump the Euphrates to the Kharmah region .

No one complained then.

In fact, I was the much linked and cited counter-point to Reid and others.

When Joe stated, "I don’t believe they need to be in the front lines with soldiers, I don’t believe they need to, uh, you know, be bothering the military for information or for access to certain areas," he made a very blanket statement.

A statment that said he felt I should not have been embedded and covering the Anbar Awakening in 2007.

If you agreed with Joe, you felt I should not have been covering the Anbar Awakening and therefore should not have been a counter-point to Reid.

Which makes me wonder how many people who are celebrating Joe now, cheered me in 2007?

You see the conundrum.  It is impossible to cheer the reporting of a Michael Yon, or Michael Totten or John Burns or the countless other even handed embeds and then support a blanket ban on embeds.

In my blogs I pointed out how ending the embedding programs would be a strategic mistake and how Joe's support for such in a sit-down, on-camera, on-the-record interview showed he did understand the importance of the media battlespace.

I never criticized his reporting work.  In fact I was complimentary of it.  I never stated he should not be there.

I did clearly state that on the policy of embedding he was wrong and his opinion of a blanket end to embedding showed that he did not understand what he was talking about.

In modern warfare, the media is its own battlespace.  Something will fill it.

Saddam's execution was closed to the media, but we all watched it.  It was recorded with a cell phone camera.

If embeds are eliminated, the information void will be filled by whoever is walking by with a video camera or cell phone, or the enemy.

You could argue that the military should be the only source, but then you will have press conferences and power-point presentations competing against video shot by local stringers or the terrorists.

We can all guess who will win that battle and it isn't the guy with a flip chart.

I took Joe's statement at face value and I took it personally.  When I first went to Iraq with elements of my old Marine Corps unit I did because I knew if I didn't cover them, no one else would.  Because I went with them, their story was told on several network TV affiliates and then those reports became my first documentary.

When someone intimates that their story should not have been told, I take it very, very personally.   

I have since been informed by Roger L. Simon, who I trust and respect, that Joe is revising and extending his remarks on embeds.

Will all of you who sent colorful emails be willing to do the same?

And to those of you on the left and the MSM who are using my disagreement with Joe on one policy position to bash his reports, let me be clear by quoting Les Grossman :

"First, take a big step back... and literally, FUCK YOUR OWN FACE! I don't know what kind of bullshit power play you're trying to pull here, but [South West] Asia Jack is my territory. So whatever you're thinking, you'd better think again! Otherwise I'm gonna have to head down there and I will rain down in a Godly fucking firestorm upon you! You're gonna have to call the fucking United Nations and get a fucking binding resolution to keep me from fucking destroying you. I'm talking about a scorched earth, motherfucker! I will massacre you! I WILL FUCK YOU UP!"

Now, I have to get back to planning my next expedition to some crap hole war zone and practicing my Pashto. 

 
Jan 13 2009
Joe the Plumber--Out of His Depth (Updated)(Again)&(Again)
Written by JD Johannes   
Tuesday, 13 January 2009

Updated Jan. 14  4:45pm & Again 10:20pm

Just got off the phone with Roger L. Simon of Pajama's Media.

Evidently I've stirred a few things up.

Roger's spoken with Joe and assures me that Joe's not in favor of a blanket ban on reporters on the battlefield and embeds.  I trust Roger's statement and Joe.

Roger gave me some background on what spurred Joe's initial comments on the street and his comments during an on-set segment on PJTV.

Here is what Joe said that made my jaw drop:

WURZELBACHER: you don’t need to see what’s happening every day, that’s my personal opinion, you don’t have to share it. But, you know, okay, you don’t have to see, you know, 800 dead, 801 dead. It’s like they drill that in your head. … They want you to sit there saying there are so many people dying. You know these are large, these are numbers, you know I don’t want to take away from that. Let me, uh, think about how to say that again. Just essentially, they keep drilling it into your head, newscast after newscast after newscast.

I think the military should decide what information to give the media and then the media can release it to the public. I don’t believe they need to be in the front lines with soldiers, I don’t believe they need to, uh, you know, be bothering the military for information or for access to certain areas. (Emphasis added)

I saw that on PJTV during an on-set interview.  I nearly fell out of my chair.  I generally agree with the first paragraph, but the second one is a bad idea. 

The first remarks like that were made on the street and off the cuff which I gave him a pass on.  On the street comments are so fast I'll give anyone a pass.  But when he said it on-set, in a sit-down interview in such a blanket way, he was advocating yielding the media battlespace to the enemy.  He didn't realize it, but that is what that statement is.  There is really no other way to read his statement than to think he means no reporters on the front lines.  No elaboration, no caveats.

Roger gave me the back story.  If the backstory had even been hinted at, I would have given the blanket statement a pass.

Joe caught a glimpse of the sausage being made.

As I stated below, embeds with an infantry unit are at the discretion of the commander.

Sometimes this almost resembles lining the reporters up and picking teams--except some people don't get picked.

If you were to suddenly be an infantry officer and had to pick a reporter to embed with your unit on an operation, would you pick Michael Yon or Glenn Greenwald or Al Jazeera or Reuters?

I would pick Yon.  Which would make Greenwald and the rest throw a fit.

An observer who is unfamiliar with the media battlespace would probably throw up his arms and say screw this, none of you should be here, unaware of the reprecussions or that preventing even handed reporters like John Burns, Brian Bennett and others would actually increase the power of the enemy within the media battlespace.

Unfortunately, that got caught on camera on the street and then he repeated in an on-set interview.

I've been there when those selections are made.  I've been there when I was allowed to go on the mission and another reporter had to stay on base.

Roger says some the little dust up will addressed and we both had a great laugh how this got spun out of control.  Roger is a friend and I trust him.

Roger also gave me a preview of some upcoming reports and they are what Joe does best and what I have enjoyed about his coverage. 

I hope this never gets lost in the translation:  Joe is wonderful when he is relating the story of regular working people in a dire situation.

As a child-less bachelor who has spent the better part of the last few years in a war zone, the things that Joe picks up on would never occur to me.  Which makes him better than I or others who ply the nuts and bolts combat reporting trade.

The ultimate irony in all this is that Joe became famous for asking Obama a question that resulted in an off the cuff remark that people pounced on. 


----------- 

Previously in this space I remarked that PJTV's sending Joe The Plumber to Israel felt like a shark-jumping publicity stunt and it was a risk that could put PJTV's credibility at risk.

After watching a few reports , I felt Joe was fine, when he related things as the average Joe that he is.  When he expereinces a rocket attack, then walks past a playground, he thinks in terms of a suburban father.  This is a very good angle and plays to his strengths.

Where Joe gets into trouble is every time he moves beyond that angle, specifically in a long report where he says reporters should not be out in the battle with the troops.

That means Joe thinks Michael Yon, Michael Totten, Bill Roggio & his team, myself and others should not be running around with infantry units.

PJTV, the first majorly funded new media venture of its kind, hired, as its first star middle east reporter, a man who thinks the U.S. Military and IDF should yield the media battle space to the enemy.

I don't know what fantasy world Joe lives in, but the media is going to cover a war however they can get access to it.  If the U.S. military or IDF doesn't allow access, you can bet the Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaida, Jaish al Mahdi, etc. will become the primary distributors of information.  Heck, they already are.

Luckily General David Petraeus sees things differently and in the counter insurgency field manual stated clearly that the media should be encouraged to embed with infantry units for long stretches of time.

And this is the hazard of sending Joe to be a media organization's star correspondent.

Far from being a burden, the media is an important compenent of modern 4th Generation Warfare.

First, in the embedding programs of the Western military, unit commanders have the option to take on an embed.  More often than not, the command puts me right in the thick of the action, even putting me in place so I can cover a large operation and allowing me to sit in on classified mission briefings.

LTC Valery Kaeveny, LTC Patrick Frank, General Mark Gurganus & LTC James McGrath put me repeatedly at the pointy end of the spear.  (In my upcoming documentary 'Baghdad Happens' the pointy end of the spear chasing down a terrorist was a Captain, a PFC, then me.)

These officers understood that if I was not there--the story would not be told.

In modern warfare, winning or losing has as much to do with polling results, election returns and roll-call votes as what happens on the battlefield.  Modern 4th Generation warfare is about turning the voting public against military effort or foreign policy.  The public is influenced by what they see in the media.

Clamping down on media access always fails because someone else then provides the content and seizes the battle space.

Which is why back in 2005 I bought a camera and a plane ticket and went to Iraq.  There was a part of the story that was not being told and I quit my job and rolled the dice to tell it.  In a perfect world, the media would already be telling that story, but we do not live in a perfect world, so I did what I felt needed to be done.

I wasn't on Fox & Friends before I left or any radio shows.  It took months of churning out copy and video before anyone in the blogosphere even noticed me.  My local paper still hasn't done the "local guy makes movie in Iraq" story yet.

By making a 15-minute-of-fame political media celebrity its point man in Israel, PJTV took a risk and they've now been bitten by it.

Joe is now the face of PJTV.  His saying that reporters should not be with front line soldiers undercuts any effort by PJTV to put reporters on the front lines of a war.

If Joe had his way, I could not have filed this report , or this report or made these documentaries .

Joe would make the government the dispenser of information--gee, what could go wrong with that?

The plumber should stick to what he does best as a media personality--relating things as a father and skilled tradesman trying to make a living.  When he moves beyond that, he is out of his depth.

UPDATE Wed Jan. 14 1:55pm

"You know, every unit should be set up like you guys are?" Sergeant Hutch said.

"Set up how?" I asked.

"Old experienced NCO's, grunts, and vehicles with optics.  And an embedded reporter like you."

The embedded reporter part surprised me. 

We were on a long mission.  The battalion was clearing Kharmah, again, and the platoon I was embedded with was tasked with hunting down some vile decapitators who called themselves the Green Battalion.

This was the second operation Hutch and his sniper team had been attached to the platoon and I had gotten to know him a little bit.

Hutch was one of the top snipers in Fallujah.  A serious operator who looked through the scope and killed insurgents, pulling the trigger betwen heart beats.

Although we personally got along well, I didn't expect that he would care much for a cameraman along on missions.  I asked him why he thought more units should have reporters embedded.

"If they are like you," he clarified, meaning former military, or in good shape and not likely to get in the way.

I still didn't get it.  So he explained it to me.  At that time in the Summer of 2005 the media's coverage of the war was farmed out to stringers who shot video or stills of the daily car bombing.  I was the only reporter running around Fallujah.  All the public saw of the war was a narrow snap shot, not the full picture and it would take a lot more embeds like me to show the full picture.

Over the years, I've seen a lot of embeds.  Some are good some are bad.  Some develop close bonds with units and soldiers.  The Strykers adopted Maya Alleruzzo.  Duce Five adopted Michael Yon.  The Regulars of 1-22 adopted Brian Bennett.

What I have found over the years is that units and soldiers don't like parachute embeds, the reporters who drop in for a day and leave.

Sergeants Michael Copney and Kenneth Edwards, who are featured in my upcoming documentary, made that point to me on a hot summer afternoon in Fallujah Bahgdad.

A New York Times reporter did a parachute.  Dropped in, rolled around with the Battalion Commander LTC Patrick Frank, then moved on.

They thought it was really cool that I went out on missions with them and took the time to interview them on camera.  They also liked movie night, where we watched the video I shot of a successful mission.

I write all of this in response to a commentor on Hotair who said that embeds are a burden and that Joe the Plumber is right--there shouldn't be reporters with infantry units.

The commentor must have glossed over the paragraph where I described embedding.

Unit commanders can decline an embed.  If they can't handle one, they don't take one.  If their mission is too complicated, they don't take one.  I've seen reporters who were just not physically able to keep up with grunts and they are not embedded.  I've even heard of them being dis-embedded and shipped to Baghdad and told never to come back.

Embedding is at the discretion of the unit commander, not the reporter.

That said, I've had units that were sceptical at first, until they got to know me.

1st Sgt. Gerald Cornell, of Battle Company was skeptical, but then he told me that once he saw me in action, running across rooftops with his soldiers he knew I was the "real deal."

One Captain, one of the greatest Captains of the war, Brian Ducote, asked me to stay on with Battle Company.  His men had started to see me as one of their own.  But I moved on.

I make myself move on.  It hurts too much to stay with them.  I will have to leave them at some point and the sooner I leave, the better it is for all of us.

I learned this lesson after spending months with Vengeance Platoon mentioned above.  I was not just a reporter, I was THEIR reporter.

On the last day of the last mission, we got hit by an IED.  Our interpreter, Ali, lost part of a leg and arm.  Everyone was angry, including me.

Ali was sitting in the passenger's back seat.  I always sat in the same seat.  If the humvee I was in had gotten hit, I would have been the one losing a leg and arm.

The next day Corporal Matt Stillman said something that showed the true inherent danger of embeds, "If that had been you, instead of Ali....it would have been a massacre."

We were all angry about Ali, but we had only known him a few days.  I had been with them for months.  The anger could have easily boiled over into something horrible.

I will never live with a unit for more than a few weeks again.

My criticism of Joe is not of the segments on PJTV.  I enjoy them.  He points out things that are never covered.  His perspective as a suburban father, a skilled tradesman is great.  He sees things I would not.  I'm a bachelor and would not be able to put what happens during a rocket attack into terms as a parent.

I've been mortared and rocketed so many times, I would probably just stand there--which is what I've done the past few times it happened in Iraq.

But when he strays into areas he is not an expert, he commits and err we all do.

The strength of the blogosphere and new media is the diversified expertise.  Law professors blogging about the Law.  Screenwriters and directors blogging about Hollywood.

My expertise is in polling, media rating points, TV News, running political campaigns and warfare.

When you throw them all together, I'm an interesting expert in those areas.

I do not blog often.  I do not blog about court cases or most of the passing things in the news.  I don't even blog about Iraq much.

I blogged about Joe the Plumber because PJTV's putting him in Israel has established him as the most recognizeable new media foreign/war correspondent and what he does reflects on me.

In my first post I explained why I wanted thim to do well and explained my apprehensions.

Those apprehensions are now being seen as justified as Joe went beyond his expertise.

His comments about embedded reporters shows how little he knows about modern 4th Generation Warfare and how embed programs work.

I understand that in a perfect world the media would be fair and truly balanced and accurate.  But we do not live in that fantasy perfect world and never will.

To end embed programs would create a vaccume in the information battlespace.  That vaccume will be filled with someone.

The solution to the media, that Sgt. Hutch lamented in 2005 is not to ban embeds, but to get more embedded reporters on the front lines.

The reports of the daily car bombing were not coming from embeds.  They were coming from stringers working unilaterally.

Joe's proposed solution to his complaints about the media will exacerbate what he seeks to eliminate and the stories of the soldiers and their daily successes would never be told.

Because he did not think before he spoke and then said it again, he showed himself to be out of his depth.

I would be out of my depth trying to relate what it is like as a father to contemplate rocket attacks.  I'm not a father, I'm not even married.  Joe as a father, is prefect to relate that part of the ongoing war.  Joe should stick to his expertise.

 
Jan 09 2009
The Deepest Battlefield
Written by JD Johannes   
Friday, 09 January 2009
"How do you defeat an idea?  How do you defeat a dream?" Colonel Bob Chase asked rhetorically.

It was the Summer of 2005, a period of stasis in Iraq before the wheels came off in 2006.

I was interviewing him on the side porch of the Saddam era palace in Ramadi that was now the headquarters of the 2nd Marine Division.

Over the Colonel's shoulder was the Euphrates and the city of Ramadi.  Eighteen months later, the battle for the city would resemble a slow moving game of tetris, as Soldier and Marines claimed the city block by block, laying down concrete barriers to hold their territory.

In the Summer of 2005, as the Operations Officer of the Division, Chase had the power of life and death.  A nod from him made people, buildings and city blocks disappear.

But those kinetic operations were only part of the answer to the question Chase needed to answer.

As I watch the events unfolding in Gaza, I remember the lessons from that Summer in Anbar province--clearing Amiriyah and Ferris twice, clearing Kharmah twice, the city of Fallujah, despite being cleared in the largest set-piece siege since Hue, was slowly being re-infested.

There will be peace in the middle east when, and only when, the Arabs finally accept that Israel will not be destroyed, the Hebrews will not be pushed into the sea and the status quo of this long running conflict is no longer worth it.

The insurgency of Iraq--Shia, Sunni, Baathist and evey hybrid thereof--operated on simple strategic concept:  Just get the U.S. to leave.

The key strategic metric for the insurgents was a poll number that asked the American public if the war was "Worth it."  The insurgent's only hope was the fickle nature of the American people and politicians in Washington, D.C.

That was how deep they viewed the battlefield.

The tide in Iraq first turned in Anbar when the tribal leaders and their kin accepted that the Marines were never leaving, Al Qaida and their associates could not deliver anything but criminality, the dream could not be achieved and getting on with normal life was the best course of action.

Michael Yon, in his book "Moment of Truth in Iraq" has a very profound statement on war:

"The American soldier is the most dangerous man in the world, and the Iraqis had to learn that before they would trust or respect us.  But it was when they understood that these great-hearted warriors, who so enjoyed killing the enemy, are even happier helping build a school or to make a neighborhood safe that we really got their attention."

The residents of Gaza, who elected Hamas, may need to learn the very hard way that Israel, with very little effort, could push them into the sea, but would rather sell them electronics and fizzy drinks.

And that is the deeper battlefield Israel needs to fight on.

General Raymond Odierno, the Commander of Multi National Forces in Iraq constantly uses the phrase "passive support."  That passive support can be for the insurgents or the coalition and the Iraq government.

It is the passive support that has propped up Hamas.  Elimination of the passive support is the only path to a lasting victory.

In Iraq, the coalition eventually had the advantage of fragile Iraqi government for the passive support to shift to.

Fatah is not much an alternative, but there isn't much else to choose from

The seemingly interminable conflict will not be resolved through negotiations.  Negotiating with an Arab is a sign of weakness and only emoboldens them.

It will end the way all wars end, decision by the losing combatant that his goals, his idea, his dream, is lost, cannot be achieved and it is no longer worth it to fight.  Some people come to this conclusion quicker than others.

When the residents of Gaza see that Israel will not stop and that no can or will stop them, and that Hamas has been selling them a fantasy, then the passive support can shift.  If, at that moment, Israel can turn on a dime and offer the alternative, maybe peace can finally be had.

A dream, an idea, is defeated by showing that it cannot be achieved or the effort to achieve it is just not worth it.

In the Middle East, this is compounded because the dream is intertwined with religion and personal identity.  Renunciation of the dream is on a level with renouncing the faith--and we know how apostates are treated in Islam.

But, I have seen enough Al Qaida and Jaish al Mahdi affiliates flip sides to know that it is possible for all but the most fervent to accept a different interpretation of allah's will.

 
Jan 08 2009
Shark Jumping? And why I'm Rooting for Joe
Written by JD Johannes   
Thursday, 08 January 2009
I don't understand the whole "Joe the Plumber" thing.

Perhaps because his meteoric rise to political celebrity happened while I was running around Iraq with a camera.

When I left for Iraq, Joe was a guy who randomly bumped into Obabma when the cameras were rolling and asked a really good question.  Obama then uttered the famous words, "spread the wealth around" and conservatives pounced.

When I get back just in time to vote, and am recovering from another bout of 'Saddam's Revenge' (which is the Iraqi variant of Montezuma's Revenge,) Joe is a full blown media personality, has been out on the campaign trail for McCain and subject to all kinds of un-authorized/illegal background checks.

Joe has a Publicity agent, endorsement deals, book deal and who knows what else--truly a storyline that could only happen in the USA.

Now Joe is headed to Israel as a correspondent for PJTV and I find myself asking, why not wall-to-wall Michael Totten instead?  Why not Michael Yon, who, if he could sneak into sector for a few hours, would be able to give a thorough prognosis of the battle.

Because, even after years of grinding work in the middle-east, churning out brilliant essays and original reporting, Michael Totten is not a media celebrity.  Same with Michael Yon, who, despite being one of, if not the most prolific chronicler of war in this young century, lacks the celebrity status of Joe The Plumber.

Announcing that Totten will be the point man and Yon will be providing battle-field updates does not warrant a splash of media coverage.

By opting for celebrity over substance, PJTV is following the well-worn path of other news media--and we know how that has turned out.

As one who left a normal career to become a war correspondent, I'm all for Joe and anyone else getting in the trenches.  And I'm all for anyone making a few bucks and travelling to Israel on someone else's dime--that is the American dream.

But I am sad that the first well funded libertarian/conservative new media network, when given the opportunity to compete with majors, has opted for what feels like a publicity stunt.

I have always felt that news is important.  The rise of the blogosphere was fueled by news junkies who felt that the news was too important to be left to the media. Now PJTV is treating very important news--the ongoing battle for the survival of Israel--as an opportunity for publicity.

But maybe I missed something while I was in Iraq.  If Joe turns out to be the communicator needed to tell the story, then Mr. Simon and PJTV made the right call and my time in Iraq produced a blind spot in my understanding.  And I hope he is good, because if he fails, the whole enterprise will fall flat.  If PJTV has jumped that shark this early in its existence, it will be difficult to take it seriously in the future.

PJTV represents a great platform for independents out covering the hot spots.  Yes, I do some work for the majors, but see PJTV as the next logical step for the new media.  I would love to be PJTV's man in some hell-hole.

Which is why despite my questioning of PJTV's news judgement, I need Joe to succeed.  If the viewer's brought in by the publicity are satisfied with Joe's work, PJTV will be successful.  If it comes off a publicity stunt, the enterprise will have taken a big hit.

Joe--don't screw it up.  Don't jump the shark, do what the Fonz should have done when confronted with the California Kid--be the real Fonz from the early seasons and punch him in the face.

 
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