May
17
2009
|
Written by JD Johannes
|
|
Monday, 18 May 2009 |
"We can't kill our way out of this," Brigadier General Mark Gurganus told me in the early summer of 2007.
Gurganus, a larger than life character was the embodiment of the warrior general. At the time he commanded the Ground Combat Element of Coalition Forces in western Iraq. I first met him 2005 when he was Colonel on a dusty patch of asphalt north of Fallujah after his humvee was blown up by an IED.
His orders were pretty straight forward that morning--find those SOBs and kill them. A few hours later the IED team caught in the act and a team of snipers dispatched them.
Gurganus' statements in 2005 and 2007 may seem contradictory in isolation, but in 2005 he saw clearly that the solution to the IED threat was not more technology but the elimination of the insurgency.
Later in 2005 his Regiment conducted one of the first and largest census data collection operations of the war. The only technology needed was a digital camera, GPS unit, clip board, pen and an access database. When Marines know who is who and who is supposed to live in a house or village, it is very hard to hide in plain sight.
By late 2007 nearly the entire Euphrates river valley had been photgraphed and listed in a database. There was no where to hide from the Marines and the Son's of Anbar didn't even need the database--they knew if you didn't belong in an area on sight.
You didn't need to spend a lot of time doing targetted raids or tracking and chasing high value targets if you had a really good list--the targets couldn't move and were quickly trapped in the net.
In today's New York Times , David Kicullen and Andrew McDonald Exum make a similar point about the use of drones to carry out precision strikes in Pakistan.
"The drone campaign is in fact part of a larger strategic error — our insistence on personalizing this conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Devoting time and resources toward killing or capturing “high-value” targets — not to mention the bounties placed on their heads — distracts us from larger problems, while turning figures like Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the Pakistani Taliban umbrella group, into Robin Hoods. Our experience in Iraq suggests that the capture or killing of high-value targets — Saddam Hussein or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — has only a slight and fleeting effect on levels of violence. Killing Mr. Zarqawi bought only 18 days of quiet before Al Qaeda returned to operations under new leadership.
"This is not to suggest that killing terrorists is a bad thing — on the contrary. But it’s not the only thing that matters, and over-emphasizing it wastes resources. The operation that killed Mr. Zarqawi, for example, was not a one-day event. Thousands of hours of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance were devoted to the elimination of one man, when units on the ground could have used this time to protect the people from the insurgency that was tearing Iraq apart."
During my trips to Iraq I saw entire High Value Target lists captured or killed only to replaced by more vile targets. This does not mean that High Value Targets should not be pursued and dealt with, but that in warfare resources are scarce and have alternative uses. Resources should be used for what yields the maximum gain and that is eliminating the insurgent's ability to operate rather than trying to eliminate insurgents one or a few at a time.
The strategies and tactics that led to the reduction of the IED threat were the ones that restricted the ability of the IED team to operate, not technologies that countered individual IEDs.
The true solution to the IED threat was to get off the roads and out of vehicles, live in the village, know everyone in the village, protect the locals, provide some essential services and kill or capture the insurgents when they popped up--in that order.
Hellfire missiles from a drone are the exact opposite. The Soviets ravaged entire valleys with helicopter gunships but the Mujahadeen multiplied. The Soviets tried killing their way out of an insurgency and proved that it is impossible.
The drone strikes in Pakistan will prove just as futile.
The battle in Afghanistan will be won much in the way the British did in Malaya. Units moved deeper and deeper into the jungles setting up small outposts and gaining the trust of the villagers by protecting them. Then the next step was to provide things the insurgents could not like medical care and commerce.
The remote villages of Afghanistan, like the villages of Malaya decades before, will reject commerce at first. It is change and humans universally dislike change, until they see the personal benefits of it.
The communist insurgency of Malaya was, ironically, beaten by the human desire for profit. The Taliban will be undone by the most basic of human emotions--greed, not hellfire missiles.
|
|
May
12
2009
|
Written by JD Johannes
|
|
Tuesday, 12 May 2009 |
I looked at the young guys as they prepared for another mission and started to choke up in tears and anger.
An hour earlier I had interviewed their commanding general. After the camera and mic were off and I was packing my gear, I asked him why he became an officer.
His answer shocked me. "To avoid the draft."
I looked at the guys I was about to on a mission with. The younger onese enlisted after the initial invasion of Iraq. Many more after 9/11. They were all volunteers.
I had to get out of sight for a moment while regained my composure.
Their Commanding General lacked their character and, in my opion, was unfit to lead them.
For many senior general officers, their first time leading in any type of combat is in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Many were platoon and company officers in the 1970s and came up through the ranks in garrison commands where the criteria and metrics for promotion have zero relationship to what it takes to win a complex modern counter insurgency.
What is amazing is that there even are general officers of the caliber required during this time of war, who can adapt and understand the micro-tactics and macro-scale.
But for every larger than life warrior general, there are two or three who will never ever leave the wire to conduct the intensive battlefield circulation required to get real unvarnished information from the Captains who are out on the streets and down in the villages.
Counter insurgencies are won by Captains and Lt. Colonels, but lost by Generals.
And sometimes it difficult to find the right General.
In Iraq, from my personal observation, the best commanders were the ones on their second tour--Division Commanders who previously commanded a Brigade or Regiment. Brigade or Regimental Commanders who previously commanded a Battalion.
The proficiency and experience at the NCO level is unparalelled, same with Company level officers. Field grade is still a mixed bag, but the weak link is with the General Officers.
The only way to find the General Officers needed to win in an enviroment like Afghanistan may be to keep firing and replacing them until the right ones are found.
My choking up after my interview with the draft avoiding General was not the first, nor the last time I got choked up and angry.
Outside the wire, I am emotionless.
But everytime I see a hero flight, or wounded young men being evaced from a remote emergency hospital to one the major hospitals in Baghdad or Balaad, tears well up.
The Soldiers and Marines will go out and fight as hard and as long as required. They deserve a General who knows how to win.
|
|
May
10
2009
|
Written by JD Johannes
|
|
Sunday, 10 May 2009 |
Well, not entirely but I agree with him on one point in his column in today's New York Times:
"But opinions, however insightful or provocative and whether expressed online or in print or in prime time, are cheap. Reporting the news can be expensive. (snip) But we can't have serious opinions about America's role in combating the Taliban in Pakistan unless brave and knowledgeable correspondents...tell us in real time what is actually going on there."
Of course the inability to rely on the mainstream media is what sent me off to cover Iraq in the first place.
But Rich's point on opinion being cheap, easy and meaningless without hard news information is valid.
The point was driven home to me in 2007 at the start of the Surge.
I was back inside the wire, having an actual breakfast with some Marines and Fox News was on the big screen TV.
Two "strategists" one Democrat, one Republican were debating the Surge.
Midway through the segment, a young Marine leaned over to me, "Mr. Johannes, those two women have no idea what they are talking about."
The Marine was correct. They had no idea what they were talking about, but they played their parts well and with conviction.
It was later that I learned where these chat show "strategists" come from .
I am now in the spool up for an expedition to Afghanistan. It is not cheap. And after having enough bullets, mortars and bombs come close but, by the grace of God, fail to kill me, the real price is that I put my life and limb on the line. Oddly enough though, financial desolation scares me more than physical decimation.
But after the first shot across the bow from the new defeat caucus last week, the trip is required.
My expeditions are financed by sales of my documentary DVDs . Occasionally I will be able to sell some footage to news outlets, but the primary is DVD sales.
My goal is to sell 200 DVDs before I depart.
The debate over AfPak will be heating up. Opinons will aired. But the facts will be in short supply because they are expensive and dangerous to ascertain.
The one time I was matched up against a "strategist" I ended the debate cold by asking, "have you ever been to Iraq? Because I just got back three weeks ago."
I have not been invited back as guest on that network.
This Summer and next Fall will be an important time in Afghanistan. Strategy and policy will be set determining the shape of the conflict. Absent information from the ground, the strategy and policy debate will likely devolve into something like the segment I watched about the Surge in 2007.
If you feel that first hand reporting from the ground is important, please buy a DVD .
In the battle of ideas, facts win. Gathering those facts is my mission.
In the modern era, wars are fought on the ground and in the media battle space. I have no doubt the Taliban and Al Qaida will be doing everything they can to create spectacular headlines, thus influencing the American public. They nearly succeeded in Iraq and did win over Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid.
To win the media battlespace requires facts. I am going to Afghanistan to document those facts and ask that if you can afford to, buy a DVD so I can afford to gather the facts and report them.
|
|
Apr
30
2009
|
Written by JD Johannes
|
|
Friday, 01 May 2009 |
After reading this report from Threats Watch , my crazy idea of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US unilaterally declaring the Tribal Frontier territories of Pakistan their own country is making more sense.
Several months ago I blogged about it here .
The Frontier territories were supposed to be able to have a referendum decades ago on whether to become their own country or join Afghanistan or Pakistan.
That never happened. And now decades later, they have become their own country and are waging a war against Pakistan proper.
If Pakistan is as close to meltdown as some fear, Pashtunistan may be the only way out.
Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries in the region declare that they recognize the sovereignty of Pashtunistan, then promptly declare war on it with help from the U.S. and anyone else willing to help resolve the issue.
It is far from an ideal solution, but in a mix of bad options and possible outcomes--the worst being a Nuclear Talibistan--it is something to consider or something that could very likely be forced upon us.
|
|
Apr
20
2009
|
Written by JD Johannes
|
|
Monday, 20 April 2009 |
|
Two years ago Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid declared the Surge a failure and the war in Iraq lost.
I was in Iraq when Reid made the statement. Here is what I wrote then .
Here are two more follow-ups.
|
|
Apr
17
2009
|
Written by JD Johannes
|
|
Friday, 17 April 2009 |
In 2007 Baghdad, Iraq was the undisputed murder capital of the world.
In the West Rashid district of Baghdad, the mayhem had spiraled so far out of control, the few residents that remained nick-named the district 'The Arena.'
While embedded with U.S. Infantry units in West Rashid in 2007, those murders, referred to by the military as Extra Judicial Killings, were a part of my daily life.
What we know now is that a few of those murders were committed by U.S. Forces.
This week a U.S. Soldier from a unit I embedded with was convicted of murder. Others from the unit have already been Court Martialed and convicted.
The unit was Alpha Company 1-18.
They are the subject of my new documentary, "Baghdad Happens".
I was not embedded with them when the murders were committed and to my knowledge, none of the Soldiers who overcame the twists of fortune to turn a mission from failure to success and are featured in "Baghdad Happens" are involved in the criminal proceedings.
It is always an honor and privilege for me to film and live with soldiers and I have the deepest respect for the young men who volunteered to take on the responsibility of warfare.
The events unfolding in the military court rooms and what is depicted in my documentay "Baghdad Surge" and "Baghdad Happens" are a tale of two approaches to war.
In "Baghdad Surge" the movie begins with a terrorist attack on some member of the Iraqi Highway Patrol and is followed-up shortly with a murder comitted by Iraqi Police.
In "Baghdad Happens" the Soldiers of Alpha prevent a murder.
In "Baghdad Surge" Captain Brian Ducote is determined to bring justice to the Iraqi police who murdered a man his unit's area of responsibility. The departed was definately not a good guy, but Ducote would not tolerate murder.
Less than a kilometer away from Ducote, other soldiers had been dispensing street justice Baghdad style.
The U.S. Army is showing clearly that it will not tolerate murder.
The most difficult part of counter insurgency is the moral component and the restraint needed to maintain that morality.
While it is impossible to win hearts and minds, it is possible to be consistent in following the rules of land warfare and that consistency makes the coalition a better alternative than the arbitrary and capricious militias.
Maintaining a moral code in combat is more difficult than actual combat operations. It requires a degree of self control civillians never have to face.
In 2007, I could feel the dread in Baghdad. Death permeated the city. It was almost like a pall had fallen on the city bringing out the worst in humans.
The Soldiers of the Surge lived with that death every day for their entire tour. Alpha had the absolute worst of it.
After a month in Baghdad, I went back to Al Anbar province. It felt like a weight had been lifted from my shoulders.
A few of the soldiers of Alpha succumbed to that weight, they were crushed by the darkness and became a part of it.
While I cannot condone their behaviour, I do understand how it happens.
"Baghdad Happens" shows some of the soldiers of Alpha Company. It is a different kind of documentary. It is upbeat. It captures the thrill of a successful mission and the complexity of even a simple mission.
It captures a group of young men on one day. It is a snap shot of the war. And that snap shot shows a group of brave men.
"Baghdad Happens" is the unintentional counter-balance to what is unfolding in the courts martial in Germany.
As the story of the courts martial grows, which it will, I hope my movie shows that there is more to the story of Alpha Company.
Yes, the darkness captured the souls of a few men, but far more of the men of Alpha were the ones who beat back the night and brought light and life back to West Rashid and Baghdad.
|
|
Apr
13
2009
|
Written by JD Johannes
|
|
Monday, 13 April 2009 |
A few days ago, after a brief exchange with Ed from hotair.com , I quickly typed up a rational choice model of how the standoff could end.
Based on the game settlements, I postulated the most likely outcome would be O4/T3.
The O4 standing for Obama Option #4 was "Pirates taken by force, Captain saved."
The T3 standing for Pirates, terrorist Option #3 was "Pirates taken by force, Captain killed, US personnel killed."
Ed, after seeing the scenarios, agreed that my O4/T3 was probably where it would end up.
I ran a another scenario in which the pirates were "run-of-the-mill" but as the facts played out, the pirates were more committed to the cause than that game scenario revealed.
The two levels of pirates addressed the big known unkown-- how recalcitrant the pirates would be.
Now, how did a blogger run a half-assed version of rational choice game theory and get it right?
Well, I can tell you I did very little research. I scanned Google headlines, skimmed the wikipedia and drew more than anything else on my experience watching these scenarios game out in Iraq.
I also run more complex rational choice game models in the political campaigns I consult on.
The key with all of these is motive. Understanding what the sides want. I don't get bogged down into "why", because that is best thought of as another thing they want.
As it turned out, President Obama as National Command Authority gave the military broad authority within the general orders. The Commander on scene made the call in split second decision, and could because the assets were in place.
When the President gave the authorization, he jumped to an O4 option. As I previously stated, O4 was fraught with danger, but the best option because it has the highest payoff. And if the pirates were terrorists, well, then there really was no other acceptable option in the scenario.
According to the initial reports I read--and I have only skimmed a few--the Pirates chose to jump into their own T3.
This was not difficult, it did not require any particular insight, just a little logic.
When you take motive into account, you can eliminate a couple of options T6, T7, T8 and O7, O8.
If you add options, lowest number being best, then divide by the number of options you get 3.27 as a mathematical settlement average.
That is the absolute most crude, poorly calculated way to play rational choice. But the models generally work like that.
Options are listed, weighted, then a settlement arrived at.
The important part is to understand that each player is acting in a way that is rational to them, which is why you need to understand motive.
Understand motive, and you can predict a lot of behaviour, even if it is irrational, people can be predictable in their irrationality.
|
|
Apr
09
2009
|
Written by JD Johannes
|
|
Friday, 10 April 2009 |
Something strange is happening in the situation of the captain being held hostage by Somali pirates.
U.S. Citizens are taken hostage by brigands rather often and rarely, very rarely is the FBI employed in these situations. As person who travels through a lot of foreign countries I know the U.S. position rather well--if you are taken hostage or kidnapped and held for ransom, you are pretty much on your own.
So, this situation has interesting components.
Lets start with what we know about the pirates:
Started operating more frequently in 1990s
They are in it mostly for the money
Usually do not harm crew
Hold cargo for ransom
Made about $150m last year
Some Pirates linked to terror groups
This particular group is thought to be linked to AQI
The other party to this situation is President Obama.
In rational choice theory, the game, when played properly, zeroes in on motive.
President Obama, like all politicians has the foremost objective of 'looking good'. His motivation is to avoid a situation that he looks bad, incompetent, weak etc. His goal is avoid an outcome where the fact pattern makes him look bad.
So, now we look at the various options, ranked in preference among the players in a very crude rational choice game.
Obama
O1 Pirates surrender
O2 Pirates release Captain, then taken by force
O3 Pirates release Captain, then escape
O4 Pirates taken by force, Captain saved
O5 Pirates taken by force, Captain killed
O6 Pirates taken by force, Captain killed, US personnel killed
O7 Pirates escape with Captain
O8 Pay off Pirates, Pirates double cross, kill captain, becomes publicly known
Pirates, non-terrorist
P1 Collect ransom, release captain, continue business
P2 Release Captain, continue business
P3 Surrender, handed over to regional authorities, continue business
P4 Surrender, wind up in prison
P5 Taken by force, Captain lives, wind up in prison
P6 Taken by force, Pirates killed
Pirates, terrorist
T1 Pay off Pirates, Pirates double cross, kill Captain, youtube video
T2 Escape with Captain
T3 Pirates taken by force, Captain killed, US personnel killed
T4 Pirates taken by force, Captain killed
T5 Pirates taken by force, Captain saved
T6 Pirates release Captain, then taken by force
T7 Pirates release Captain, allowed to escape
T8 Pirates surrender
If we are dealing with run-of-the-mill pirates, then the outcome will be P3, the pirates surrender then are handed over to regional authorities who slap their wrists and let them continue business.
In this scenario everybody pretty much gets what they want.
But, if we are dealing with terrorist pirates, look at how the options line up on the continuum. The best case for Obama is the worst for the terrorist pirates and vice versa.
Anything from O5 through O8 is politically unaccepable to Obama and O4 has a probablity of turning into O5. But O4 has a high payoff.
Anything beyond T4 is politically unacceptable to the terrorists. This assumes that the pirate terrorists are full on nut jobs ready for martyrdom. If they are not committed to the Jihad, then it will be a P3 with a P5 veneer, or O5. They will let themselves be taken.
If these are terrorist pirates, then this is a test. To see what Obama does. At which point the result is transmitted to the world and Obama's measure is taken. Terrorists play more for Gross Rating Points and headlines than they do for tactical advantage.
An ocean standoff dragging on would be good for GRPs, especially if the terrorist pirates let it be known they are terrorists. This is bad for Obama politically, but allowing them to stall is tactically smart. The terrorists will tire out, run out of potable water and food.
The tactical downside risk is that they just go ahead and kill the Captain then martyr themselves in whatever fashion is most dramatic--which gets them what they wanted anyway, headlines.
So, the settlement is O4/T3. Obama rolls the dice, lets the SEALS do their thing and if all goes well, the result will be O4. O4 also has the most positive GRPs for the United States--not just Obama.
But this drama on the high seas is only Act I. What really counts is the follow-on actions that will resolve the piracy problem or allow business as usual.
This game I have mapped out is 'on-the-fly' I have not calculated weights on what is known, the known uknowns and the most important factor the uknown unknowns. The unknown unknowns--the things you don't know and don't even realize you don't know--are what usually what destroy a plan or a model. I have not even really thought out the motives, which is the key, and the scenarios the motives would operate on.
|
|
Apr
08
2009
|
Written by JD Johannes
|
|
Wednesday, 08 April 2009 |
|
In response to the demands and actions of Muslim Barbary Pirates, President Thomas Jefferson sent the Marines . (Marines and some professional military contractors.)
Thus the verse in the Marine Corps Hymn , "To the shores of Tripoli."
Muslim pirates, this time centered around Somalia, are once again making demands and threatening U.S. interests.
Will Obama respond like Jefferson?
Previous blogs mentioning the Barbary Pirates as the first U.S. war with Islamic enemies here and here .
UPDATE: Crew of the hi-jacked vessel has overpowered the Pirates. So, we'll have to wait and see if the Pirates present another opportunity for Obama to act, or, if he will use this instance as justification for going after the Pirates O'Bannon style.
|
|
Apr
07
2009
|
Written by JD Johannes
|
|
Wednesday, 08 April 2009 |
"I was tired," Firas said when I talked with him last October in Baghdad.
Firas, a former Jaish al Mahdi Special Groups commander, had been on the run from coalition forces since the summer of 2007. By the late summer of 2008, he was ready to throw in the towell and work with the coalition.
Firas was one of many 'good enough' bad guys who have decided, at least for then, to sort of work with the coalition.
Prior to flipping sides, Firas was a wanted man. He never slept in the same place twice and was barely one-step ahead of U.S. Soldiers for months.
Firas opened up communications with the soldiers and they cautiously started to work out an agreement.
Talking with the enemy is nothing new. It is as old as warfare and almost required in counter insurgency.
In the original counter insurgency, Julius Caesar's campaigns to put down rebellions in Gaul, Caesar regularly recieved ambassadors from the rebelling factions.
In the Roman Civil war, Caesar corresponded with Pompey.
Caesar also made a habit of enlisting soldiers of conquered armies into his army.
In Baghdad, during the surge, I saw Lt. Col Patrick Frank call up JAM leaders on their cell phones. Captain Brian Ducote would talk with Sunni and Shia assassins, letting them know that they could turn themselves in, or face his soldiers on the streets of West Rashid.
What these conversations all had in common was the position of strength. Caesar always negotiated from a position of strength. Lt. Col. Frank and Capt. Ducote were speaking from a position of strength. The were dictating the terms. Firas, when he approached the U.S. Army Battalion in Rashid did it from a position of supplication and self preservation.
In President Obama's new AfPak plan, the section "Encouraging Afghan government efforts to integrate reconcilable insurgents", states:
"While Mullah Omar and the Taliban's hard core that have aligned themselves with al Qaeda are not reconcilable and we cannot make a deal that includes them, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won without convincing non-ideologically committed insurgents to lay down their arms, reject al Qaeda, and accept the Afghan Constitution."
This will require talking to the enemy. The key is that the talking cannot be just to talk. It cannot be done from a position of weakness, it must be done the way Ducote and Frank and Caesar it--from a position of power where the choices are clear, quit, join us, or face off against us and suffer the consequences.
In the Victorian era, British officers like Robert Warburton, who managed the Khyber pass for 18 years, held the tribes accountable for miscreants in their midst. Warburton fined the tribes when their members got out of hand and made it clear that the tribal Maliks were responsible for keeping their clans and territory in order.
Warburton and others used the same technique Lt. Col. Steve Russell used in Tikrit--I can come here with the hand of friendship or with a pistol, the choice is yours.
Or, as in the message Marine General Mattis is reputed to have sent to Iraqi tribal leaders: "I come in peace. I didn’t bring artillery. But I’m pleading with you, with tears in my eyes: If you fuck with me, I’ll kill you all."
But, you must be willing to use the pistol. You have to back up your position of strength with lethality and effective COIN operations.
The Soldiers and Marines know how to do this, they have done it before. The component required for the President to fulfill is to employ enough combat forces on the ground and to back up the Soldiers and Marines with the same metal they display while outside the wire.
The enemy reads the New York Times, they watch CNN. They will take the President's measure and if it is lacking, if they think he will blink first, if he shows any signs of weakness, then the Soldiers and Marines though operating from local strength, will be in a strategically weak position to offer and enforce the ultimatums needed to flip those Taliban fighters who can be reconciled.
|
|
|
Blog 
