Jun
03
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 03 June 2009 |
As noted in the WSJ editorial , the confirmation hearings for Lt. Gen. McChrystal were pretty much a non-event.
There were plenty of agitators wanting to pick a fight, but President Obama possess a set of unique abilities as Commander in Chief--namely that he is a left leaning, mostly anti-war Democrat.
But because he has taken ownership of the fight in Afghanistan many of the agitators are blunted.
Which is an ability I hope he continues to use.
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Jun
01
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Monday, 01 June 2009 |
Yard signs, posters and banners were every where in Kuwait in May 2005.
I was in transit limbo and had a few days to catch glimpses of the campaigns.
It is amazing how political signs look the same everywhere--how there is almost a regression to the mean in all political campaigns no matter what country they are in.
I was reminded of Kuwait's elections by this column in the WSJ .
After Islamist parties won elections, many thought it proved democracy promotion was a bad idea. Why promote democracy if the wrong parties get elected?
But the same waxing and waning of parties and ideologies we see in Western countries applies to Arab countries as well.
What is important is not who wins a particual election but that the machinery of elections and democracy itself which holds those who won accountable.
In selectorate theory of elections, a large voting pool and frequent elections forces a moderation as the ruling elite must maintain a large and diverse coalition.
Promotion of legitimate elections as a policy cannot be judged by one or two election cycles, but must be viewed over the long term.
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May
27
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 27 May 2009 |
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I am beginning to feel a bit like Captain Willard in the opening scenes of the movie Apocalypse Now.
No, I'm not getting stoned, doing shots and practicing kung fu in my underwear, but I am ready for the next mission. This one is to Afghanistan.
I just got my transit date for mid-July and am making all the logistical arrangements.
This trip is significantly more expensive than Iraq. It is almost double the cost of an Iraq expedition.
I finance these trips with DVD sales .
The important work is not so much the final filmed product but the on the ground reporting.
To fully finance this trip I need to sell another 143 DVDs this month and 250 in June.
The coming months will be a critical time in Afghanistan as General Petraeus and Lt. Gen. McChrystal begin implementing what could be the final push to wrest the Taliban from their strongholds.
It will be important to have as many eyes, ears and camera lenses on the ground as possible.
Another 393 DVDs sold will put me there.
You can also purchase them through Amazon.com .
This is not my first trip to the rodeo. I've covered the wars since 2005. I know the risks and accept them because the work is important.
The news is too important to be left solely to the MSM.
If you can afford to please purchase a DVD, or you can also make a contribution via paypal.
I will go wherever the story is and have no compunction against putting myself in harms way. I just would like a little help with the airfare.
JD
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May
22
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Friday, 22 May 2009 |
"Now you can take back our answer, which is that we consider that, if the case of becoming friends with the King, we shall be more valuable friends if we retain our arms than if we surrender them; and if it is a case of fighting, we shall fight better if we retain our arms."
That was response of the Greek General Clearchus to the amabassadors of the Persian King Ataraxerxes. And it will be similar to the response the Iranians give to President Obama.
In 401 B.C., a group fo 10,000 Greek mercenaries joined an ill-fated attempt by Cyrus the Younger to seize the throne of the Persian empire from Ataraxerxes. Cyrus was killed in battle and the Greeks were on their own, deep in Persian territory along the Tigris river.
One of the King's ambassador's made the Persian position clear:
"The Kind considers that, since he killed Cyrus, the victory is his. He thinks that you, too, are in his power, since he has got you in the middle of his territories, surrounded by impassable rivers, and can bring against you such masses of men that you could never kill them all."
The Persian King clearly felt he was operating from a position of strength in demanding the Greeks surrender their arms, but he was not understanding the absolute logic of the situation as the Greeks viewed it.
Two Greek officers made their responses.
Proxenus said, "[is] the King asking for our arms by right of conquest or as gifts to show our friendship. If it is by right of conquest, why should he have to ask us for them instead of coming to take them?"
But Theopompus made the logic clear to all:
"The only things of value which we have at present are our arms and our courage. So long as we keep our arms we fancy that we can make good use of our courage; but if we surrender our arms we shall lose our lives as well. So do not imagine that we are going to surrender to you our only valuables."
In the current era of negotiations with the Persians, who are now called Iran, they are employing the logic of the Greeks.
The potential of a nuclear weapon is their most valuable asset.
If the US truly wants to be friends with the Iranians and wishes them no ill will, why do we care if they have nukes? The US gets along fine with other nuclear powers.
And the US is such a dominant power, why don't they just come and take the weapons away?
The Greeks understood that King Ataraxerxes was not in a truly dominant position and were not certain if the King really wanted friendship.
The Greeks kept their arms and their journey out was chronicled by their eventual leader, Xenophon in the book 'The Persian Expedition.'
President Obama is, in some ways, in the position of Ataraxerxes and the Iranians know it.
In middle eastern culture, the person seeking to negotiate is seen as being in a position of weakness.
We in the west for some reason have adopted negotiation as the default political position and are ignoring the absolute logic of the situation.
The most valuable thing the Iranian regime possess is the threat of nuclear weapons. If they give it up and the US reneges on any promises, the Iranians have nothing.
Therefore the Iranians will respond like Clearchus.
"Now you can take back our answer, which is that we consider that, if the case of becoming friends with the King, we shall be more valuable friends if we retain our arms than if we surrender them; and if it is a case of fighting, we shall fight better if we retain our arms."
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May
21
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Thursday, 21 May 2009 |
In a previous post I mentioned how embeds can enhance operations in the media battlespace by providing fact from the ground.
Today's Wall Street Journal shows a classic scenario.
If an embed had been with the unit in question, a lot of the back-and-forth would have ended immediately.
But now we have Taliban sympathizers putting bodies on display and the military offering a 'report.'
The military report is likely 100% correct, but in the media battlespace imagery wins. Gunsight imagery may help, but is no substitute for images and reporting from a third party, on the ground as the events were happening.
It is only a matter of time before the Taliban starts 'arming' their cells and supporters with flip cameras to record images of 'civillian' casualties.
In the media battlespace a $100 camera can be the most effective weapon.
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May
20
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 20 May 2009 |
In discussing the decline of weekly news magazines, John Podhoretz explains the decline in media in general :
"Why was the Time of my professional youth so successful? Because its readers hadn’t died off yet. Because cable news hadn’t hit yet. Because news organizations hadn’t surrendered to the siren song of soft puff pieces that completely destroyed their authority with the readers they still had."
It is not just news magazines and flag-ship newspapers but the entire media universe all the way down to local TV news.
When I was producing the 6 & 10 p.m. news at the CBS affiliate in Topeka, KS the management commissioned a massive market research study by a consulting firm.
The firm came back with their results of the "news" people wanted to see. It was not news, it was fluff.
And while the station retained its top spot in the ratings, total viewers kept slipping.
Another market reasearch poll was conducted and the news cast was loaded with even more fluff and coverage of meaningless events.
Total viewers continued to decline.
Perhaps because I was the only person in the newsroom who studied economics and philosophy vice journalism, I saw the flaw in the poll. It was a random sample of people who owned telephones and did not test in whether or not they actually watched the news.
At one time the local evening newscast was a mass market product--there was nothing else to watch.
With cable and satellite, there are hundreds of other options. News has become a niche, but the station still thought they were a mass market product.
Instead of focusing on what the core of news viewers wanted to see, the station offered them fluff and car crashes with the occasional government or elected official at a press conference.
There is still a market for hard news and in-depth reporting. It is the same size as it always was. There is plenty of "analysis" and opinion chatter. But the organization that fills the gap with real, important, unbiased information will be well positioned for the future.
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May
20
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Wednesday, 20 May 2009 |
The Taliban cannot dislodge US or NATO forces from any outpost or valley. They can make movement in the country dangerous, but not halt it.
The Taliban's best hope for victory--the US leaving Afghanistan--is not on ground, but in the media battlespace.
President Obama is perhaps the first war-time Commander in Chief able to engage in the media battlespace since World War II.
In modern guerrilla/insurgent warfare against an industrial Western opponent, the goal of the insurgent is not to follow the traditional three phases as espoused by Mao, Che and Ho and defeat the Western power on the field of battle.
The goal is to get the Western opponent to leave.
Retired Marine Colonel T.X. Hammes makes the case in his book 'The Sling and the Stone' that the goal of the modern insurgent is to influence the voters and politicians of the Western country. The goal being to sway public opinion to the point that the voters feel the war cannot be won or, even if it could be won, is not worth it.
The modern insurgent understands that the public views the war through the prism of the news media and therefore establishes his strategy around earning maximum Gross Rating Points showing chaos, mayhem and that the war cannot be won or even if it could, is not worth the cost.
The key measurements for the insurgent can be found in a January 2009 poll by the Pew Center for People and the Press.
Q49 Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force in Afghanistan?
Jan09 Feb08 Dec06 Jan06
Right 64 65 61 69
Wrong 25 24 29 20
Q50 How well is the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan going?
Jan09 Feb08
Very well 7 10
Fairly well 38 38
Not too well 34 31
Not at all well 11 10
Q51 Over the next year, do you think the number of troops in Afghanistan should be increased, decreased, or kept the same as it is now?
Increased 33
Decreased 39
Kept same 20
Q53 Regardless of what you think about the original decision to use military force in Afghanistan, do you now believe that the United States will definitely succeed, probably succeed, probably fail, or definitely fail in achieving its goals in Afghanistan?
Definitely succeed 13
Probably succeed 49
Probably fail 23
Definitely fail 6
Right now, those numbers are not very good for the Taliban. But at one time, the war in Iraq had similar numbers.
The goal of the insurgent is to sway Western and US voters from the "succeed" to "fail" columns and break the tie on "well" vs. "not so well."
They will do this through the news media.
On two occasions I tabulated the Gross Rating Points on the Iraq war, the most recent was in 2007 .
From June 2006 to June 2007, there were 12,624 pessimistic ratings points and 6,798 optimistic ratings points about the Iraq war.
Even after the success of the Surge was becoming obvious in late 2007, it took until September 2008 for enough points to be earned for the voters to catch up with the reality on the ground.
The Taliban's only hope is to leverage media to their advantage and earn more pessimistic ratings points. They will do this through spectacular attacks that may or may not have any tactical effect on the ground. A dismal failure of an assault on a US or NATO installation still generates the Taliban's preferred headlines.
To the Taliban, the desired strategic effect is through the media battlespace--not on the ground.
President Obama's relationship with the media will allow him to do what his predecessor could not--engage in the media battlespace.
Many would think that the best way to stave off pessimistic ratings points would be to lock the media out of Afghanistan. But, all that does is make the Taliban the primary content generator as they will record and distribute video of their attacks.
The media battlespace would then become a competition between the Taliban's graphic video and a military spokesman at a podium. The graphic video will win every time.
The first step for the Obama administration would be a policy of maximum embedding, preferrably long-term embeds where a reporter lives with one unit not just for days, but for weeks. This is current doctrine, spelled out the Counter Insurgency Manual FM 3-24 written by General David Petraeus, but is rarely put into action.
The more third party eyes and ears on the ground, the less the impact of the Taliban's spectacular attacks on the media battlespace.
The goal is maximum gross ratings points therefore diluting the content generated by the Taliban.
The second step is out reach to small and medium sized media outlets.
At any given time there are dozens of Reserve and National Guard units in Afghanistan, but covering them is complicated and expensive for smaller market newspapers and TV and Radio stations.
To reduce the cost, the DoD could move the embark point from Kuwait or Qatar to a stateside installation, provide body armor and rapid embedding to the Guard and Reserve units to be covered. (The embark point for all US based media could be moved stateside as well.)
The medium and small market outlets should also be given better access to the DIVIDS system to allow for exclusive, real-time reports to be transmitted back to the home market.
Slots for each media market could be awarded by lottery or Nielson ratings or bid--whoever guarantees the most ratings points gets first dibs.
In that same line of thought, rules for long-form or documentary productions could be relaxed allowing more production on speculation and festival circuit directors to embed without backing from a studio.
Media outlets should also be allowed more flexibility to "cross deck" moving from embedded to traveling with private security or a local fixer. This would reduce the cost of maintaining a secure facility as a bureau. The media sets up bureau offices in the White House, Pentagon and most State Capitols. Media organizations should be allowed to build a shack or rent a container to house their bureau on major bases like Victory Baghdad or Bagram.
The current media embed system is major leap forward from the micro-management of Desert Storm, but I do not think it has ever been reviewed in terms of how it can be re-tooled to maximize access and rating points.
The third step is the one that could only be instituted under President Obama, and that is to recognize that modern wars are also fought in the media battlespace and that the DoD needs to aggressively fight in that battlespace.
This is not an endorsement of government generated propaganda, but a policy that the DoD will actively engage the enemy in the media battlespace.
In the past the media howled when the idea was even broached, but President Obama's relationship with the media will allow him to show the neccessity of this policy.
If anyone thinks the DoD or Administration is generating propaganda, they can take a trip to the combat theaters. Some will say that they just get drive by tours of Potemkin Villages, but it is impossible to sustain a fraud for months or weeks with embeds in every Brigade or Regimental Combat Team.
The DoD will need to engage the media battlespace in theatre as well. This means newspapers, magazines, web, radio, TV, DVDs, satellite and even entertainment television. Yes, many often forget that the ratings points from entertainment programming are just as powerful as points in the news media.
In 2006 the media howled at the Coalition's efforts to take an the media battlespace through paid editorials in Iraqi newspapers. But just as Clauswitz described war a politics through other means, operations in the media battlespace is warfare through other means. President Obama's relationship with the Western 4th Estate could blunt criticism of effective tactics and strategies that will win the battlespace.
The Iraq war was nearly lost in the media battlespace. The Taliban will refine their strategy and wage the battle of ratings points smarter and harder in the coming year.
If President Obama is serious about winning in Afghanistan, and I believe he is, then he must not only fight the battle on the ground but employ his strongest assets and engage the Taliban in the media battlespace.
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May
19
2009
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Written by JD Johannes
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Tuesday, 19 May 2009 |
In today's New York Post , at the end of an interview with General David Petraeus, he is asked what books he is reading.
"The Pathans," by Olaf Caroe, the classic work on the Pashtu of Afghanistan and Pakistan, for its wonderfully rich history;" Petraeus said.
Nice to know Petraeus and I read the same books. I read 'The Pathans' several months ago. It is an old book, thus uncolored by current politics and events.
Other books I consider essential reading include:
'Afghanistan' by Louis Dupree
'Eighteen Years in the Khyber' by Sir Richard Warburton
'Soldiers of God' by Robert Kaplan
'A History of the Kingdom of Cabul' by Mountstuart Elphinstone
The most recent of the book is 'Soldiers of God' written toward the end of the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
The oldest 'A History of the Kingdom of Cabul' is from 1815.
For another interesting view of Afghanistan I would suggest 'The Great Game' by Peter Hopkirk. It is a wonderful narrative of the various adventures and intrigues by the British and Russians during the 18th and 19th centuries.
Reading the old, obscure books helps build a foundation to understand current events. Reading the history of the Arab/Muslims people by al Tabari helped me understand Iraq in greater depth.
Reading the classics of warfare by Caesar and Xenophon shows that despite changes in technology, warfare remains essentially the same because it is still conducted by humans.
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