Bill Ardolino is out on patrol with 2nd Assault Amphibious Bn. based out of Camp Fallujah as they perform MSR security along MSR Mobile.

I rode in one of Gators Tracks during a mission that was only noteable for the weather and it seemed that Gator was always in the neighborhood when Vengeance was out on a mission including one along the same road Bill blogs about.

I spent some quality time along MSR Mobile in 2005 performing a variant of the typical MSR security patrol we called "bait and kill."  Vengeance Platoon performed the bait and kill to perfection--even if it is unnerving being the IED bait.

MSR security is one of the least glamourous and most debated missions in Iraq.It is inherently a defensive mission, unless there is a bait and kill variant involved.  As a general rule, insurgencies are not defeated with defensive missions.

In my conversations with several field grade officers, many of them chafed at MSR security missions as vicious circles.

You secure the roads so logistics convoys can travel to resupply the people securing the roads. 

This is part of the internal debate within the military over on-the-ground tactics.A base like Camp Fallujah has a couple thousand residents who need food, water and diesel fuel to power generators.  The more people, the greater the need for supplies, the more vital a mission like MSR security becomes. 

But securing the roads does not defeat the insurgency--identifying, locating, and arresting or killing the bad guys defeats an insurgency.  Interdicting the insurgents logistics--cash, IED making materials, IED makers, weapons caches, defeats an insurgency.

Which leads to three considerations--

1.  Train the Iraqi Army to where it is proficient at doing the identifying, locating, killing and interdicting.  (Which we are doing)

2.  Bring in more U.S. grunts to do the identifying, locating, killing and interdicting.  (Which is being contemplated)

or, the rarely discussed...

3.  Remove all non-essential personnel and contractors from Iraq.Number three has the advantage of reducing the vicious logistics circle, freeing up units, like 2AAV to devote more resources to killing and inderdicting or working with Iraqi units doing the interdicting and killing.

(When I was in Iraq, Gator proved themselves effective at finding weapons caches.  On one mission they found an underground bunker complex complete with several people being held captive and tortured by the local branch of AQI.)

All three options have their merits--but only when it is properly understood that the way to defeat an insurgency is to kill and interdict.

On Wednesday, we'll find out if there is a new strategy, or just the same road we've been travelling.

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