(Note: This is a condensed version of a much longer article that will run later, once all the events of the operation have run their course. JD)
Combat Outpost Reilly, Afghanistan-- In the mine strewn canal country of Marja, Afghanistan the knowledge that the next step you take could be your last weighs on your mind--at least for the first few hundred steps. After 11 kilometers, about 21,000 steps through poppy and wheat fields, muddy and mucky irrigation canals and sunbaked flats, the thought is almost erased from your mind, until you hear an unmistakeable concussive boom 1,500 meters away.
Lt. Colonel Vadim Fersovich, a retired Soviet/Russian Spetznas officer who served two years in Helmund, Roman Genn, an artist and contributing editor to National Review magazine and this writer followed the Marines of Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines on "Harvest Moon" a three day operation deep into the southern canal country of Trek Nawa, in the Marja district of Helmund province Afghanistan.
The intent of the mission was to disrupt enemy activity and clear any overt enemy presence from a 30 square kilometer area south of their patrol bases by searching every mud walled compound, haystack, berm and pile of rubble with their Afghan Army partners.
For three days the Marines trudged through the fields avoiding roads, trails and bridges over the canals where the enemy frequently buries homemade landmines triggered by pressure plates.
Fersovich said the Soviet Army never did clearing operations like this
one Helmund in the late 1980s and could only recall one similar
operation. "There were Soviet Army battalions on the left and right
flanks to prevent the enemy from escaping and the Afghan army pushed
down the middle searching the compounds. The Soviet soldiers did not
search the compounds."
The main driver of instability in Trek Nawa, Marja and the entire
Helmund river valley is opium and the disruption of age old tribal
settlement patterns.
Before the massive irrigation system was created by the American led
Helmund Valley Development Authority, the valley was sparsly populated,
with villages clustered along the river. As the canal water flowed into
the flood plain, people moved away from their traditional family lands,
intermixing with new tribes and ethnic groups who moved into the
greater Marja area. The traditional power structure of land owning
Khans and tribal leaders called Maliks began to break down and the new
arrivals saw the potential for wealth and began to position for control
of the poppy trade creating competition between them and the fractured
legacy tribes of the valley.
Further complicating the situation was the imposition of communism in
the late 1970s and early 1980s which sought to deminish the power of the
Khans and Maliks. The outbreak of the Soviet Afghan war tipped the
combustive mix into chaos as local tribes formed complex alliances
Mujahideen groups seeking to gain access to the revenue stream produced
by the vast poppy fields.
An unclassified report prepared for the Marine Corps Intelligence
Activity details how tribes in Helmund joined Mujahideen groups from the
eastern mountains near the Pakistan border and even Tajik dominated
Mujahideen groups based in the far north east.
"Into this power vacuum stepped opportunist clerics convincing the rural
population that communist, modernist – and secular – forces were not
only attacking their tribal structure, but they were also threatening
Islam, itself," the Marine report states. "Local loyalties were
complicated by competition for control of the opium trade in this
volatile, unstable mix of minority tribes, clans and families having no
direct ties to the traditional ruling tribes."
The "opportunist clerics" of the Akhundzada family spread their
influence to the central Helmund region of Marja consolidating their
power during the brief period of the Mujahideen government before the
Taliban and fighting a winning war against Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e
Islami Mujahideen group for control of the opium trade.
When the Taliban took power in the late 1990s they gave large land
grants to their allies, further disrupting the loyalties and power
structure.
Much of the current Afghan on Afghan violence and Taliban on Afghan
violence is a drug war between rival tribal and ethnic criminal
groups. The capital 'T' Taliban of Mullah Omar and theQuetta Shura is
just one player in Trek Nawa and the greater Marja area. Many other
others, especially the opportunistic clerics could lumped together as
competing small 't' talibans.
The Helmund Valley Development Authority's irrigation canals represent
another case of American and Western development aid blowback--aid that
was supposed to bring stability, 50 years later drives instability.
"What do they want?" Lt. Colonel Fersovich asked rhetorically about the
enemy. "It is all economics, no?." Fersovich says that in his time the
greater Marja/Nawa area was dominated by four or five criminal gangs.
Even to this day he does not call them Mujahideen.
The average poppy farmer wants to farm and make a living. The local
strong man wants to make a bigger living so he can leave Trek Nawa and
maybe build a poppy palace in the suburbs of Kabul. The drug lords of
Kabul want to move to villas in Dubai. It is a war driven by ambitions
fueled by funds from opium.
Exactly how planting land mines and shooting at Marines increases the
profit margin is difficult to understand until you calculate the overall
competition for the poppy profits. The Afghan government does poppy
irradication, not the Marines, But without the Marines providing
support, the feable government around Marja would collapse. Given the
notoriously corrupt nature of the Afghan government, it is easy to
believe that the much of the irradication is directed at rival groups
making the Marines play a peripheral role in the drug wars.
Operation Harvest Moon was the first incursion deeper into the canal
country, but not the last. It has been only a little over a year since
the Marines moved in the Marja area and when Golf Company arrived in
Trek Nawa the Marines controlled little beyond the main supply road. In
three months they have set up the first set of outposts and plan to
push further south establishing more patrol bases with their Afghan
counterparts this summer.
"Where we stayed the second night, that is the frontier, there hasn't
been an American or Westerner down there maybe in decades," said Captain
Frank Mease, commanding officer of Golf Company. More will be coming
soon. The next Marine unit will push deeper south, as will the unit
after that until the interlocking network of patrol bases suffocate the
ability of enemy groups to operate.
The Marines are taking on a mission even the Soviet army with its
free-wheeling use of fire-power declined. "The Soviet Army never went
to Marja. We were told it was too dangerous," Fersovich said.
As the old WWII recruiting poster says, try telling that to the Marines.
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| Opium poppies |
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| A scored opium poppy, black tar sap seeping through |
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| Captain Frank Mease, Commanding Officer of Golf Company, pauses to talk to a local wheat and poppy farmer |
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| Lt. Colonel Vadim Fersovich, Russian Army retired. Fersovich served in Helmund province from 1986 to 1989 during the Soviet/Afghan war. (photo by Roman Genn) |
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| A typical canal to be jumped. It would be a lot easier to jump them without all the gear and body armor |
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| Another typical canal |
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| The Marines settling in for the night after the first day of Operation Harvest Moon |
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| Marines cutting across a wheat field. The Marines cut cross country to avoid land mines buried on the roads, trails and other easy places to walk |
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| JD Johannes walking through a poppy field in the Trek Nawa area of Helmund province, Afghanistan. (photo by Roman Genn) |
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| Roman Genn, contributing editor at National Review Magazine and JD Johannes at the end of the push south during Operation Harvest Moon. |
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