I will be giving a speech / presentation in Chicago at the 1st Infantry Museum on March 3rd.

The topic will be counterinsurgency in Iraq.

Click here for more information about "A Date with History"

Another write-up from David Bellavia (with some interesting comments.)

LTC Ahmed, the commander of an elite police unit in Salah ad Din province,  was assassinated on by a suicide bomber on Dec. 4th in central Tikrit, Iraq. 

Ahmed was among the first to step forward in 2003 and 2004 to work with Coalition forces in Tikrit. 

From the powerful Jabouri tribe centered North of the city, he quickly gained a reputation for being brash, fearless and willing to whatever it took to eliminate terrorists. 

I met him a few times this past October while embedded with 2-32 Field Artillery, the US Battalion that worked side-by-side with Ahmed. 

And he lives up to the quotes about him. 

"He was controversial, flamboyant, brave, and effective," U.S. Col. Walt Piatt told the Associated Press .  "He single-handedly disrupted numerous enemy plots during the last election - He was the go-to-guy in the province." 

During a Joint Security meeting I sat in on he puffed on double corona cigar and then joked that I should be paying him for the privilege of having a picture with him. 

"Angela Jolie wants her picture with me," he joked. 

We then talked about how after I finished up my work with the Army I should spend a few days embedded with him.  (I have been known to take off my body armor and jump in a pick up truck with an Iraqi officer to go for a drive around town .) 

I took down his cell phone number and told him the serious Inshalla--I'll spend a few days with you on this trip unless Allah prevents it.  I ran out of time on this trip to embed with Ahmed but toyed with extending a few days to embed with him.  If I had, I could have been with him on Dec. 4th. 

As I travelled around the province I inquired with other Iraqi police about Ahmed and his reputation.  From Bayji to Dujayl, he was a legend. 

The reports of him personally killing 250 plus insurgents/terrorists are not puffery.  The number of terrorists killed by men under his command is much higher. 

Ahmed had a lot of enemies.  The conventional wisdom is that Al Qaida killed him.  But the facts are probably murkier. 

Someone or some group didn't just want Ahmed dead--they needed him dead. 

I just returned from Iraq and people have started asking me what I think of the Afghan Surge.  (I spent some time in Afghanistan this Summer.)

The Afghan Surge can work if Battalion Commanders on the ground fight the war correctly and if it lasts longer than one troop rotation.

As of this morning I am lacking in confidence on both counts.

Via Jules Crittenden I read about operation "Cobra's Anger."

As the headline to Jules' blog makes clear, it is a classic Hammer & Anvil operation and destined to be a waste of time and resources.

I participated in a dozen such operations in Iraq--sometimes clearing the same areas twice!

But don't take my word for it.  In late 2005 I was introduced to the book that became the game plan for the Marines 'The Long Long War:  The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960' by British Brigadier General Richard L. Clutterbuck.  Reading Clutterbuck is like reading the history of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but written in 1966.

Here is a telling quote:

"Initially, because of their previous training and experience, senior army officers were inclined to launch their units into the jungle in battalion strength--either in giant encirclement operations when a[n] [insurgent] camp was known to be in the area, or in wide sweeps based on no informatin at all.  Neither of these types of operations had any success.

"The predilection of some army officers for major operations seems incurable.  Even in the late 1950's, [near the end of the war], new brigade commanders would arrive from England, nostalgic for World War II, or fresh from large-scale maneuvers in Germany.  On arrival in Malaya, they would address themselves with chinagraphs to a map almost wholly green except for one red pin.  'Easy,' they would say.  'Battalion on the left, battalion on the right, battalion blocking the end, and thena fourth battalion to drive through.  Can't miss, old boy.'  So a thousand long-suffering lieutenants, sergeants and privates would be launched on an operation described by some name as 'hammer and anvil' or 'splitting the disc' or 'rabbit hunt.'"

The Hammer & Anvil came up in today's New York Times as well.

"Ever since Osama bin Laden escaped American forces in December 2001, crossing the mountains of Tora Bora from Afghanistan into Pakistan, American strategists have spoken of a “hammer and anvil” strategy to crush the militants. Until now, the border has proven so porous, and Pakistani governments so squeamish about a fight, that the American hammer in Afghanistan was pounding Taliban fighters there against a Pakistani pillow, not an anvil....

"“We finally have an opportunity to do a real hammer-and-anvil strategy on the border,” said Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who follows the Afghan war. “We’ve never done it before because we’ve had insufficient strength on both sides of the border or insufficient political will on the Pakistani side.”"

The Hammer & Anvil operation at the street level requires the Taliban to be stupid enough to actually get into a stand-up gun-fight with US Marines.  The enemy, with the exception of a few morons with an extreme desire for martyrdom, usually gets smart, drops the AK-47 and fails to cooperate rendering the whole operation a waste of time and diesel fuel. 

At the Strategic, country-wide level Hammer & Anvil analogies are absurd.

Any Company, Battalion or Brigade commader in Afghanistan would be well served by reading Lt. Colonel Jim Crider's paper published by the Center for a New American Security.

(I embedded with Crider's unit in 2007 and recently bumped into him in Iraq.  He is now the G3 (operations officer) of the 3rd Infantry Division.  Although he is doing important work in Iraq, I feel his experience and talents could be put to greater use in Afghanistan.)

There is no way to Hammer an isurgency to death.  The best way to beat the Taliban is to strangle it to death by conducting a detailed census, building a huge database so you know who lives in each mud hut then going out and confirming the census data daily.  The census data prevents the Taliban from hiding in plain sight forcing them to move on to another area or be slowly suffocated, cornered and then, finally engaged and killed or captured.

In Iraq, most of them just gave up or switched sides.

Squandering time and resources with Hammer & Anvil operation is bad enough--but the real flaw in the Afghan Surge is the lack of time.

For this lesson we go back in time 130 years and learn a lesson from another Brit, Sir Robert Warburton whose book "Eighteen Years in the Khyber" is essential reading to understand the tribal areas of Afghanistan/Pakistan.

Warburton writes about discussions he had with the leaders of the tribe around Jalalabad and their skepticism.

"Sahib, when Major Cavagnari first came here we joined him and threw in our lot with the British government, thinking you were goin to remain here for good.  But you cleared out on the first opportunity and left us to our fate.  For six months we lived with rifles in our hands, dreading every moment that our last day had come--not that Amir Yakub Khan oppressed us, but that our real enemies, our cousins, heirs to our landed property, were hounding on the Mullahs to attack and kill us because we had been friends to the Feringhi, [outsiders, non-muslims] so that our cousins might get hold of our houses, lands and possessions.  You have come again, and we have once more joined our fortunes to yours.  Tell us now what your government intends to do in the future.  Are you going to forsake us once more, and leave us in the hands of our enemies?"

The Afghans are asking us the same questions they asked Warburton and when we say that the Surge is temporary what motivation is there to help NATO and US forces?

The Afghan Surge can work with the application of proper tactics and time--a lot of time.

Everyman, at least every family, was the judge and avenger of his own cause...the interest and principle of the bloody debt are accumulated; the individuals of either family lead a life of malice and suspicion, and fifty years may sometime elapse before account of the vengeance be finally settled.

But that is the most base understanding of the blood debt.

In Iraq and Afghanistan tribal leaders often negotiate the blood debt to a cash or property settlement.  The family and tribe of the deceased agree to not seek blood if they are compensated.

Just yesterday I witnessed a highly formalized negotiation about the blood debt by the nascent Tribal Union in Dujayl, Iraq.

Dujayl Tribal Union meeting in a school auditorium

The goal of the Tribal Union is to unify the tribes in this agrarian community so to have a unified voice before the civil government.

To do that, the any disputes need to be resolved quikcly and equitably.  The leadership of the Union is proposing standardized procedures to resolve grievances.

Meeting a school auditorium and sitting on plastic chairs, more than 100 Sheiks took part in the open meeting of the Union.

The Tribal Union is a relatively new creation in Dujayl.  In the early years of the war, US forces went looking for anyone and everyone who would cooperate with them.

In Dujayl a man who spoke English was the first to shake the hand of US forces.  He said the right things and put on a good act.  But he was not a real Sheik and had no real influence.

He did make a lot of money off the US though.

During the Surge and after, it became obvious that the Sheiks Council of Dujayl was populated by scoundrels.  The US officers began to follow the tribal roots back to the real Sheiks.  The fake Sheiks fled, the Council was dissolved and the Tribal Union formed.

US Army CPT Justin Daubert sits on the stage during the meetings, as a representative of the strongest and richest tribe in Dujayl, but does not take an active role in the open meetings.

CPT Daubert does his work behind the scenes with key leaders to steer them through the bureaucracy and encouraging the Sheiks to keep working on unification.

After a prolonged session of hand-shakes and kisses on the cheeks, the Sheiks took their seats and got down to business.

The first issue to be tackled--the blood debt.

A motion was put forward that if a member of one tribe kills the member of another tribe, the standard, the killer or his tribe or family should pay the victim's family 20 million dinar--about $20,000 US dollars.

Many of the Sheiks seemed to think the number was fair.  There were proposals for a higher payment, up to 50 million dinar or for a sliding scale is the killer's family was poor.

The main topic of debate was who and how the case would be judged.

A room full Sheiks

Proposals were made on how Sheiks would be selected to ensure they would be impartial, who could represent the accused and the deceased and the mechanism to ensure that once a judgment was issued it was carried out.

All these matters were discussed in the presence of the Mayor of Dujayl, the Chief of Police and two members of the City Council.  The Mayor even took part in the deliberations.

How the law of the government would interface with tribal law was barely touched on.

People are arrested, prosecuted and convicted for murder in Iraq.  The blood debt is tribal version of a wrongful death suit that also prevents inter-tribal violence.

After the usual rounds of passionate sounding debate the issue was tabled and at some point in the future a committee will prepare proposals for the Union to vote on.

The next item taken up by the Union was all the bad drivers the need for traffic laws in Dujil.

All agreed that the young kids drive like maniacs and something needs to be done about it.  When an Iraqi says you drive like maniac--you are truly a hazard to everything on the road.

The meeting adjourned, hands were shook, cheeks were kissed, the US Army officers were pressed by the Sheiks for more development projects.

The Tribal Union fills a gap between the rural population and the civil government providing some type of representation and voice.

In the upcoming elections, tribal groups could be the deciding factor whether there is a strong unity slate elected from Sala Ad Din or if they will continue to take their local arguments with them to Baghdad.

Once the US Army leaves, the tribes will become stronger.  Tribal groups that are organized will be in position to negotiate directly with Baghdad and the provincial government.

The long term goal of the Union is to become the equivalent of a powerful lobbying group and voting block.  Together, the tribes represent a lot of voters who could punish or reward politicians.

The success of the Union will be based on its cohesion and ability to deliver votes.

If the open list is used in the upcoming elections, then the single non-transferrable vote system will be in place.  The groups that can turn out the most votes in the most organized fashion will be the ones to hold power in Iraq.  The Union is on track to do that.  But first it has to resolve all the tribal disputes and standardize the payment of blood debts.

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In the lexicon of Iraq, few words carry as much meaning as Samarra.

This city on the Tigris river north of Baghdad was the source of the sectarian slaughter of 2006 and 2007 and the scene of some the most violent fire fights of the same era. 

Even as late as 2008, it was city to be by-passed when traveling north or south on Highway 1. 

The city is peaceful enough now, but still struggling with an identity crisis.  It is a Sunni city but home of a holy Shia shrine that draws millions of pilgrims a year.  It was once the leading city of Sala ad Dihn province, but during Saddam's regime, the seat of government was moved to Tikrit.  The Sunni tribes fought with the coalition to rid the city of Al Qaeda, but the Shia security services from Baghdad dominate the old quarter near the Golden Mosque.

And it was the second bombing of the Golden Mosque in 2006 that was the catalyst of the sectarian upheavals and rampant murders of 2006 and 2007.

The Golden Mosque is being rebuilt, the city is very safe by Iraq standards and the pilgrims are returning in force.

Last night the local grade school performed their Veteran's Day program titled "Americans We".  I was very moved by the first song and wanted to share some grade school kids singing something worthwhile.

If you would like a copy of the complete program, please contact us and I'll let the school know if there's enough interest.

Sala ad Dihn Province, Iraq-- 

In the US many Americans barely notice Veterans Day.  The banks and post offices are closed.  Federal Employees have the day off.  Some states and local governments may be closed. 

There are ceremonies and memorial services. 

But here in Iraq it is another day at work in a combat zone. 

The Soldiers of the 1-28 Infantry, the Black Lions, went about their work. 

I went with a Platoon to the city council meeting in Ishaki, a small town south of Samarra. 

The Platoon Leader sat back during the meeting and let the Iraqis do their work.  After the meeting he talked about the timeline of some development projects with the Council President. 

The meals were the normal rations heated up by Army cooks.  The big KBR Dining Facilities are for big bases, not little outposts. 

The kitchen at the JCC in Samarra is of typical design. 

If many of the Soldiers realized today was Veterans day, they didn't show it. 

I didn't really realize until I looked at my pocket calendar. 

For decades veterans were older men.  Now they are women and men in their early to mid twenties, many on their second tour in a combat zone. 

They were not drafted.  They did not join when the entire nation was mobilized for war. 

They volunteered when the war in Iraq was unpopular.  They re-enlist knowing they will face a fight in Afghanistan. 

They are the ones willing to stand on the wall that protects the modern culture--the plastic-disposable-drive-thru-strip-mall culture of America from the people who want to burn it all down. 

Too many of the people in the drive-thru culture went about their day today without realizing what the young men I was with today do for them. 

It is a luxury they enjoy because Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and even Airmen will leave the plastic world and enter the real world.

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I do not know what victory looks like in a counter insurgency.  With the recent bombing in Baghdad it is hard to say that a true victory and a true peace has been achieved.  There are still deadly attacks on US troops.

The true success of the war in Iraq will be revealed in the coming months and years.

But what is for sure is that the fight is now being waged by the Iraqi police and, to a lesser degree, the Iraqi army.

After full implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement on June 30th 2009, the US role in the remaining counter insurgency has dwindled.  The US Forces in Iraq are no longer waging an active war against violent extremist networks, their role now is stability, economics, governance and training.

The US Forces Iraq fill a gap between the central government of Iraq and local government.

Here in Saladin province north of Baghdad the 4th Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division is rapidly adapting to the new normal.

In 2007 during the troop surge the 4th Brigade was deployed to some of the roughest parts of Baghdad like West Rashid, Ammel, Bayaa and Rustamya.  I was embedded with unis from the 4th Brigade in 2007 and filmed the soldiers as they actively hunted down Jaish al Mahdi and Al Qaida cells and shot it out with hidden gunmen.  I went with them on grueling daily patrols through the neighborhoods to conduct census and intelligence gathering missions.

In 2007 the Iraqi Army and Police were in the background and at best they were merely ineffective, at worst they were aligned with the active enemy.

Now, in late 2009, the 4th is back in Iraq in the area around Tikrit with a whole new mission.